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I. INTRODUCTION
International enforcement of the world’s antitrust laws is a
developing project, but recovery for private victims remains elusive
due to the complexities of national sovereignty.1 To illustrate, suppose
all of the wool textile manufacturers in Pakistan agree to fix the price
of cotton textiles. One of these cartelist in turn signs a contract in
Karachi for the sale of cotton textiles to a non-wholly owned subsidiary
of a US clothier located in Sri Lanka, which takes the textiles and
manufactures pants. It sells these pants to its parent company at cost
for distribution around the world, which includes retail outlets in the
United States. Assuming the price of the cotton textiles was higher than
it otherwise would have been but for the price-fixing agreement, where
is the proper locale for the US clothier to seek redress, personal
jurisdiction over defendants and other procedural arguments aside, and
what is the proper applicable law?2 Is the nexus to the United States
1. For clarity’s sake, the term “antitrust” is an American convention, whereas the more
commonly employed synonymous term is “competition.” See ELEANORA POLI, ANTITRUST
INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES IN THE GLOBALISING ECONOMY 2 (2016) (describing the genesis
of the American “antitrust” as relating back to the late nineteenth century when US cartelists
would label their joint activities “trusts” to conceal their collusive nature); PETER MORICI,
ANTITRUST IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM: RECONCILING U.S., JAPANESE, AND EU
APPROACHES 3-4 (2000) (noting that though competition policy has a broader meaning than
antitrust policy in most cases, the terms are used interchangeably); Diane P. Wood, The
Impossible Dream: Real International Antitrust, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277, 278 (1992) (noting
that “antitrust” is synonymous with “competition” and “antimonopoly”). Labels may vary by
country, such as in China where “antimonopoly” is used or in France where “concurrence” is
used for the body of law. See 中华人民共和国反垄断法 (Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s
Republic of China) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007,
effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68 (China)
(setting out China’s antitrust law); CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.][COMMERCIAL CODE] arts.
410-1 to 470-8 (Fr.) (book IV entitled “de la liberté des prix et de la concurrence,” or “Freedom
of Prices and Competition”).
2. As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to highlight that in such conflicts-of-law
situations courts will typically dismiss cases rather than apply foreign regulatory law, such as
antitrust law, due in part to the longstanding principle that states will not apply the penal, tax, or
regulatory rules of another state. See William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws
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strong enough to justify subjecting the Pakistani cotton producers to
US antitrust law, or does the existence of a foreign non-wholly owned
intermediary purchaser and a non-US point of sale sufficiently weaken
the United States’ interest in applying its own laws? What if the
Pakistani cotton textile manufacturers had no knowledge of the initial
purchaser’s corporate ownership, which would have intimated the
possibility of the price-fixed cotton textiles ending up in the United
States? And surely Pakistan would take issue with the United States
imposing US law in private litigation to the detriment of a large portion
of the Pakistani economy and Pakistan’s ability to independently
regulate its own commercial affairs.3
In the past fifty years the world has experienced a marked increase
in international trade. Global exports have exploded (in constant 2010

Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 109 (1998)
(discussing that US courts dismiss cases where foreign antitrust law governs); Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, International Law, and
Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES COURS 311, 322ff (1979)
(expounding the “public law tabu” that explains why states decline to apply foreign penal, tax,
and regulatory laws in domestic fora).
3. Indeed, these issues have been voiced in recent influential cases on US antitrust law
extraterritoriality. See Brief of the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 2, F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004)
(No. 03-724) (“Germany also has an interest in seeing that German companies are not subject
to the extraterritorial reach of the United States’ antitrust laws by private foreign plaintiffs –
whose injuries were sustained in transactions entirely outside United States commerce – seeking
treble damages in private lawsuits against German companies.”); Brief of the Korea Fair Trade
Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees’ Opposition to Rehearing En Banc at 3,
Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-8003)
[hereinafter KFTC Motorola Brief] (“Under prevailing international norms, claims should be
brought in a country in which the underlying transactions took place and should be governed by
the laws of that country rather than by the antitrust laws of the U.S., the commerce of which was
not directly affected by the transactions.”); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry of Japan in Support of Appellees at 5, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU
Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-8003) [hereinafter Japan Motorola Brief]
(“[T]he Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan [is concerned] that the applicability
of treble damages, which are not common outside the US, will be expanded through excessive
extraterritorial application of US competition law, and that, as a result, Japan’s ability to regulate
its own commercial affairs will be interfered.”); Brief for Amicus Curiae her Majesty the Queen
in Right of the Province of Saskatchewan, Canada, in Support of Petitioners at 21, Agrium Inc.
v. Minn-Chem, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 12-650) [hereinafter Saskatchewan
Minn-Chem Brief] (“[T]he Seventh Circuit’s expansion of the FTAIA’s “direct” requirement to
include any “reasonably proximate causal nexus,” as well as its interpretation of the “import
commerce” provision of the FTAIA, will impede the legitimate interest of the Government of
Saskatchewan to adopt and implement policies to maximize the efficient export of potash and
other products.”).
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dollars) from US$1.6 trillion in 1965 to US$22.7 trillion in 2015.4 Total
exports’ share of the global economic activity more than doubled in the
same period, from twelve percent to twenty-nine percent in 2015.5 But
while markets for goods and services transcend national borders,
antitrust laws regulating these markets are national in scope.6
Historically, the United States has served as the primary enforcer of
antitrust law for private litigants due to its early development of redress
for these litigants, including the availability of treble damages and other
plaintiff-friendly procedural mechanisms, as well as the progressively
long extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act.7 Its evolution as the
4. World DataBank: World Development Indicators, THE WORLD BANK,
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#
[https://perma.cc/2DTJ-YEW8] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (database of macroeconomic data).
Average annual growth, estimated through a least-squares growth rate, was a healthy 5.2 percent.
Id.
5. Id.
6. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Final Report of the International Competition Policy Advisory
Committee to the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust 35-36 (2000),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/final-report [https://perma.cc/JPT3-MLX9] (last visited Oct. 26,
2017) [hereinafter ICPAC Report] (describing the implications of globalization for international
antitrust enforcement); Matthew Cooper, Comment, The Role of Positive Comity in U.S.
Antitrust Enforcement Against Japanese Firms: A Mixed Review, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J.
383, 383 (2001) (citing ICPAC Report).
7. See WILBUR L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 45 (5th ed.
1996) (“For years the United States was the only country with antitrust laws, and only in the
past two decades have we seen the beginning of active enforcement in other countries of a scope
to be compared to the U.S. antitrust laws.”); Reza Rajabiun, Private Enforcement and Judicial
Discretion in the Evolution of Antitrust in the United States, 8 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 187, 19193 (2012) (discussing the divergence of the US antitrust enforcement system from the common
mold of other countries); Susan E. Burnett, Comment, U.S. Judicial Imperialism Post Empagran
v. F. Hoffman-La Roche? Conflicts of Jurisdiction and International Comity in Extraterritorial
Antitrust, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 555, 571, 571 n.69 (2004) (noting that as of World War II,
when extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act began, the United States was one of the few
countries with developed antitrust laws and that while some European states had common-law
or statute provisions against restrictive practices, the United States was the home of “antitrust”);
Spencer Weber Waller, The United States as Antitrust Courtroom to the World: Jurisdiction and
Standing Issues in Transnational Litigation, 14 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 523, 532 (2002)
[hereinafter Waller, Courtroom] (explaining the incentives for plaintiffs to seek recovery of
antitrust harm in US courts, including treble damages, extensive discovery, jury trials, class
actions, contingent fees, and potential punitive damages). Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15, not only grants private litigants the right to sue antitrust perpetrators but also the
ability to collect threefold damages (treble damages) plus all fees related to bringing suit.
The Sherman Act, enacted in 1890, prohibits companies from entering into agreements that
restrain trade and proscribes anticompetitive conduct arising from or leading to monopoly. See
15 U.S.C. § 1-7; STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE
NEW GLOBAL REALITIES 97 (2015) (summarizing the Sherman Act); Charles W. Smitherman
III, The Future of Global Competition Governance: Lessons from the Transatlantic, 19 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 769, 796-7 (2004) (same). To be clear, this Note will only address the
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world’s antitrust courtroom was, of course, grounded in the interest of
protecting national commerce and allowing its citizens to recover from
wrongful acts committed at home or abroad.8 Internationally,
widespread antitrust law only began to emerge decades later when, for
instance, the European Union (“EU”) introduced its own antitrust law
in the form of Articles 85 and 86 (now 101 and 102 in the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”)) in the 1957 Treaty
of Rome, which initially founded the European Economic
Community.9 The private right to sue would wait until 2014, when the
European Commission (“EC”) issued Directive 2014/104/EU (“the EC
Directive”),10 requiring EU member states to legislatively facilitate
private enforcement of competition law at the national level.11
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act to foreign conduct, though it will reference “U.S.
antitrust law” generally. It should be noted that US antitrust law, found in Title 15 of the U.S.
Code, is comprised of several acts that are jurisprudentially different from the Sherman Act in
terms of cross-border application. See Russell J. Davis, Annotation, Extraterritorial Application
of Federal Antitrust Laws to Acts Occurring in Foreign Commerce, 40 A.L.R. Fed. 343, n.1
(2016) (highlighting that the majority of antitrust actions involving extraterritorial conduct are
brought under the Sherman Act due to the broader phrasing of its substantive provisions); Earl
W. Kintner & Katherine Drew Hallgarten, Application of United States Antitrust Laws to
Foreign Trade and Commerce—Variations on American Banana Since 1909, 15 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REV. 343, 365 n.104 (1973) (explaining the jurisdictional implications for the Clayton
Act, another US antitrust statute).
8. See infra § II. See also Edward D. Cavanagh, The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons
from the American Experience, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 629, 629 (2010) [hereinafter Cavanagh,
Lessons] (characterizing the American private right of action under antitrust law not just as a
means to redress harm but also “as a complement to public enforcement to assure the detection
and prosecution of antitrust offenders” where government resources were limited to accomplish
these objectives).
9. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11. The Treaty of Rome has since evolved into the TFEU, which was signed in 2007
and is the current governing treaty of the European Union. See Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2008 O.J. C 115/47 [hereinafter TFEU]. The
European Union was formed from the European Economic Community with the signing of the
Maastricht Treaty in 1992. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37.
10. Directives are edicts of the European Union that require member states to achieve a
certain result without articulating the means by which the result must be achieved. See TFEU
art. 288 (“A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State
to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and
methods.”).
11. Directive 2014/104/EU, 2014 O.J. L 349; see infra § II.B. While Australia has
developed a limited system for private redress since the 1970s, private actions to recover harm
from anticompetitive behavior are even rare in other English-speaking legal systems besides the
United States, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, though recent UK law allowing for
collective action suits may change that trend. See Rajabiun, supra note 7, at 192 n.19 (noting the
lack of recourse for private victims of antitrust harm); John Pheasant, Private Antitrust Damages
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With nowhere else to go, private litigants have naturally flocked
to the United States for remedial assistance, creating an issue for
developing antitrust regimes.12 Several implications attend foreign
plaintiffs seeking recovery in the United States. American courts have
recognized the importance of allowing foreign plaintiffs to bring claims
in the United States under the Sherman Act.13 Before 2004, there was
a significant chance that parties injured abroad by global cartels that
directly harmed the United States would be able to sue in US courts to
recover their losses.14 But, as illustrated above, private litigants
in Europe: The Policy Debate and Judicial Developments, 21 ANTITRUST 59, 59 (2006)
(explaining that “the low level of reported cases [in Europe] suggests that [private] actions are
still relatively rare”); Matthew O’Regan, United Kingdom: Consumer Rights Act 2015
Introduces New Procedures for Competition Litigation, Including Collective Follow-On
COMP.
L.
BLOG
(Oct.
5
2015),
Damages
Actions,
KLUWER
http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2015/10/05/united-kingdom-consumer-rights-act-2015introduces-new-procedures-for-competition-litigation-including-collective-follow-ondamages-actions/ [https://perma.cc/AS9L-ZBDB] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (“[The Consumer
Rights Act 2015 provisions concerning private actions in competition law] have been described
in the media as introducing ‘US-style class actions law suits’; whilst this is undoubtedly
somewhat hyperbolic, it is clear that things will never be the same again.”); infra notes 18, 214.
12. See S. Lynn Diamond, Note, Empagran, The FTAIA and Extraterritorial Effects:
Guidance to Courts Facing Questions of Antitrust Jurisdiction Still Lacking, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 805, 805 (2006) (“The United States has the most developed and aggressive antitrust regime
in the world, so it is not surprising that parties injured by worldwide price-fixing conspiracies
would prefer to litigate their claims here than anywhere else.”); Waller, Courtroom, supra note
7, at 532 (describing the aspects of US law that make the United States a favorable litigation
venue for private antitrust litigants).
13. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314-315 (1978) (addressing in dicta
that foreign purchasers generally had proper standing to bring claims under the Sherman Act);
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgium World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 938 n.109 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (observing that “Congress has expressly allowed foreign corporations to sue for violations
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.”).
14. See Eleanor M. Fox, Remedies and the Courage of Convictions in a Globalized World:
How Globalization Corrupts Relief, 80 TUL. L. REV. 571, 580-81 (2005) [hereinafter Fox,
Remedies] (explaining that the US Supreme Court’s decision in F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A. restricted the United States’ antitrust jurisdiction to hear claims from foreign
plaintiffs alleging harm from a worldwide cartel if US defendants were no longer a party to the
suit despite the cartel’s activities directly harming the United States); infra §§ II.A; III.B. After
2004, American courts have reiterated that US antitrust adjudication is proper for foreign
plaintiffs only if the injury the party endures – that is, the “effect” arising from the proscribed
anticompetitive conduct – occurs with US borders. See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran
S.A. (Empagran), 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004) (holding that only parties claiming domestic injury
may maintain a US lawsuit under the Sherman Act); Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics
Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 2015) (asserting that US antitrust law is not meant to redress
foreign victims realizing foreign harm); Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 858
(7th Cir. 2012) (“U.S. antitrust laws are not to be used for injury to foreign customers . . . [but it
is a] well-established principle that the U.S. antitrust laws reach foreign conduct that harms U.S.
commerce.”); Lotes Co., Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., Ltd., 753 F.3d 395, 413-14 (2d

2017]

INTERNATIONAL COMITY BALANCING TEST

233

applying US antitrust law for redressing harm that occurred abroad
create tensions over sovereignty with other countries.15
Moreover, bringing claims to the United States strips valuable
opportunities for young foreign antitrust regimes to develop their own
jurisprudence, depressing the effectiveness of global antitrust
enforcement and stalling the emergence of private redress.16
Cir. 2014) (finding that a foreign plaintiff harmed by foreign anticompetitive conduct that
coincidentally caused a domestic effect was barred from bringing Sherman Act claims by the
FTAIA because the domestic effect did not give rise to the foreign plaintiff’s claim). See infra
§§ III, IV.
15. See, e.g., Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritoriality in U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement,
67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159, 160-61 (1999) (discussing that aggressive extraterritorial application of
the Sherman Act brought “considerable backlash from foreign governments”); Mark S.
Popofsky, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Jurisprudence, in 3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND
POLICY 2417, 2423 (2008) (describing the controversy associated with US antitrust law
extraterritoriality with US trading partners). See also infra § III.
16. See Fox, Remedies, supra note 14, at 580 (recognizing that effective enforcement by
every antitrust jurisdiction would be better than the United States unilaterally strengthening its
own enforcement efforts for global benefit). But see generally Dodge, supra note 2 (arguing
that, due to the complexity of multilateral conflict-of-law approaches weighing foreign interests,
US courts should only employ Alcoa’s US-centric effects doctrine to encourage growth of
international antitrust law so long as all courts similarly apply such unilateral approaches); Harry
First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International Competition
Law, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711 (2001) (drawing on the US prosecution of the Vitamins Case cartel
to show that aggressive US extraterritoriality can lead to comprehensive international antitrust
enforcement).
Others have proposed ideas for multilateral international antitrust enforcement, including
a proposal from a group of antitrust scholars (the Munich Group) that involves the creation of
an international agency tasked with enforcing a globally adopted antitrust code. See Int’l
Antitrust Code Working Grp., Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATTMTO-Plurilateral
Trade Agreement, 5 WORLD TRADE MATERIALS 126 (1993) [hereinafter DIAC] (proposing the
establishment of an international antitrust agency sharing the responsibility of enforcement of
an international antitrust code with national governments); Wolfgang Fikentscher, On the
Proposed International Antitrust Code, in ANTITRUST: A NEW INTERNATIONAL TRADE
REMEDY? 345-47 (John O. Haley & Hiroshi Iyori eds., 1995) (describing the code by one of its
drafters). The DIAC addresses private redress in a similar fashion to EU law: mandating that
national governments provide for certain remedies, though ultimately allowing each signatory
to determine the appropriate parties to seek remedial action. See DIAC, supra note 16, at 18081 (addressing “Remedies” under Article 15 to include redressing private harm but stopping
short of creating a private right of action); see also infra § II.B (summarizing the EC Directive).
However, because such an international code is not yet a practical reality, this Note will focus
on how US jurisprudence should operate in absence of international law to create a suitable
environment for the growth of international private redress. For more information on the DIAC
or other supranational antitrust law, see Steven L. Snell, Controlling Restrictive Business
Practices in Global Markets: Reflections on the Concepts of Sovereignty, Fairness, and Comity,
33 STAN. J. INT’L L. 215, 221-235 (1997) (discussing the search for international consensus on
antitrust law, including the DIAC); Ulrich Immenga, Export Cartels and Voluntary Export
Restraints Between Trade and Competition Policy, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 93, 150-51 (1995)
(introducing the recommendation for the DIAC); see generally Wood, supra note 1 (examining
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Worldwide jurisdictions are increasingly recognizing the importance
of private rights of action to enforcement efforts.17 Within the past ten
years several countries have expanded private parties’ ability to recover
harm from unlawful anticompetitive behavior by allowing collective
action.18 However, private actions remain rare in many developing
antitrust jurisdictions with little, if any, precedent establishing the basis
for compensatory damages or discovery.19
In response to international criticism of the statute’s unbridled
transnational application, the United States has curtailed the Sherman
Act’s reach both judicially and legislatively.20 Judicially, courts looked
to international comity, the practice of taking into account the interests
of other nations.21 The Ninth Circuit was the first court to invoke
efforts and difficulties in establishing an international antitrust code); Mark R. Joelson & Joseph
P. Griffin, International Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices Engaged in by
Transnational Enterprises: A Prognosis, 11 INT’L LAW. 5 (1977) (advocating for an
international convention as the most effective means of curtailing restrictive business practices
engaged in by transnational enterprises while detailing challenges and past attempts).
17. See infra § II.B. See also Cavanagh, Lessons, supra note 8, at 629-30 (highlighting
that while private remedy in the United States has been under siege in federal courts, the rest of
the world has been contemplating the adoption of the private right of action); Pheasant, supra
note 11, at 59 (noting that the 2004 Ashurst Study authorized by the EC recognized that
importance of private enforcement of EU competition laws due to insufficient resources at the
EC and EU Member States’ national competition authorities). But see Rajabiun, supra note 7,
at 190-91 (detailing resistance to private enforcement, particularly in civil law countries and
those with small economies).
18. See, e.g., Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 15 (Eng.) [hereinafter CRA 2015] (providing
procedures to make it easier for groups of purchasers to seek compensation in UK courts from
firms that have fixed prices and formed cartels); Class Actions Law, 5766-2006, SH No. 2054
p. 264 (Isr.) [hereinafter Class Actions Law] (prescribing uniform rules on the submission and
conduct of class actions with the object to improve the protection of rights granted under Israeli
law, including Israel’s antitrust law); Neil Hodge, Class Actions: The Consumer Rights Act,
INT’L BAR ASS’N (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?
ArticleUid=6cb4718f-9845-4d8d-8a1f-e571fbdd4b56
[https://perma.cc/2UU3-N8FK]
(archived Oct. 26, 2017) (describing class action structures around the world). See also § II.B.
19. See Ilene Knable Gotts, Editor’s Preface, in THE PRIVATE COMPETITION
ENFORCEMENT REVIEW vii (6th ed. 2013) (identifying Lithuania, Romania, Switzerland, and
Venezuela as countries with a dearth of private antitrust litigation); supra note 11. See also infra
§ II.B.
20. Griffin, supra note 15, at 160-62 (discussing measures taken by US courts and
legislature to correct the Sherman Act’s jurisdictional overreaching); Popofsky, supra note 15,
at 2423-28 (describing the judicial and congressional response to the international controversy
over US antitrust law extraterritoriality).
21. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (“[Comity] is the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens
or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.”); BREYER, supra note 7, at 96
(introducing various conflict-of-law doctrine); Dan E. Stigall, International Law and Limitations
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international comity in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,
N.T. & S.A., which used an interest-balancing test to determine whether
exercising jurisdiction was proper.22 Legislatively, Congress enacted
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (“FTAIA”),
which attempts to delimit and define the cross-border reach of US
antitrust laws by introducing an objective test under the effects
doctrine.23 Powerful arguments can be advanced in the American
interest for applying US antitrust laws beyond US borders, including
adequately protecting American competition and consumers, deterring
inimical foreign anticompetitive behavior affecting the United States,
especially in an increasingly globalized economy, and providing
remedial measures to US victims of such conduct.24 However, these
interests in providing protection and redress are counterbalanced by
equally important rationales for limiting the extraterritorial span of US
on the Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. Domestic Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 323, 335-36 (2012) (detailing the use of comity in limiting extraterritorial
jurisdiction in international law). See infra §§ III, IV.
22. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). See infra § III.
The American federal judicial system, which has exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising
from the Sherman Act, is structured into three tiers: district courts are courts of first instance,
circuit courts generally provide appellate review of district court decisions, and finally the
United States Supreme Court issues final appellate review, often to resolve conflicting legal
conclusions that arise between circuit courts. See HOWARD M. ERICHSON, INSIDE CIVIL
PROCEDURE: WHAT MATTERS AND WHY 224-27 (2d ed. 2012) (explaining generally the US
federal court system). There are thirteen circuit courts, which are either geographically restricted
by the district court from which they take appeals and designated by a number from one through
eleven, or are assigned appeals based on the specialized categories of disputes. Id. at 4, 224
(describing US court of appeals). While Supreme Court decisions are binding on all lower courts,
which include circuit courts, circuit court decisions are binding only on appellate panels within
the circuit and lower courts below them, though the decisions may be used as persuasive
authority for all others. Amy E. Sloan, If You Can’t Beat ‘Em, Join ‘Em: A Pragmatic Approach
to Nonprecedential Opinions in the Federal Appellate Courts, 86 NEB. L. REV. 895, 916-17
(2008) (summarizing the hierarchy of precedent in the US federal court system with footnoted
exceptions); Charles A. Sullivan, On Vacation, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1143, 1179ff (2006)
(explicating the precedential effect of federal appellate court opinions). District court decisions
have no precedential weight. See Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 1366,
1371 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that “there is no such thing as ‘the law of the district,” in that federal
district court decisions do not bind subsequent cases); Sullivan, supra note 22, at 1179
(explaining that district court opinions are not set precedent for later cases).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982) (statute limiting extraterritorial applicability of the Sherman
Act); see infra § III. It is important to observe that this Note discusses jurisdictional issues with
respect to the FTAIA liberally, though it is recognized that according to recent appellate
decisions, such as the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Minn-Chem, the FTAIA’s jurisdictional
impact may exist as a substantive element for a claim rather than a procedural issue of whether
a US court has the authority to adjudicate a claim. See infra note 36.
24. See infra § II.B.
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antitrust law, such as costly overregulation, avoiding international
disputes, allowing nascent worldwide antitrust regimes to develop to
beget increased antitrust enforcement, and avoiding harmful
interference with antitrust regulators’ amnesty programs.25
The aforementioned responses to these competing concerns have
been ambiguous, inconsistent, and over-inclusive or under-inclusive.26
In particular, the poorly worded FTAIA has created more problems
than it has solved, including inconsistent holdings, wrongly decided
cases, and disagreements among the circuit courts over interpreting the
statute’s language.27 The most recent interpretational difficulty
involves determining what constitutes a “direct” domestic effect under
the FTAIA. Some courts have held that “direct” takes on a broader
meaning, where conduct causing domestic effect need only be an
“immediate consequence.”28 In comparison, other courts have
narrowly interpreted the statute’s “direct” domestic effect requirement
as calling for “a reasonably proximate causal nexus,” drawing from tort
law to exclude an injury that is too remote from the injury’s cause.29
25. See infra § III.
26. See infra §§ III, IV.
27. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Empagran, three federal circuit courts
interpreted the FTAIA in three different ways. See Thomas Köster & H. Harrison Wheeler,
Appellate Courts Split on the Interpretation of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act:
Should the Floodgates Be Opened, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 717, 719-25 (2004)
(describing the circuit split); Diamond, supra note 12, at 805-06 (same). After Empagran, the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits disagreed on interpretation of the statute. See infra § IV. See also
Diamond, supra note 12, at 819 (“Why were there so many different interpretations of the
FTAIA? It is widely considered to be a poorly drafted statute, full of ‘double negatives, triple
negatives, carve-ins and carve-outs and a proviso that is an exception to one of the exceptions,’
and even its legislative history is contradictory.”) (quoting John H. Shenefield, Attorney,
Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Remarks at the N.Y. State Bar Ass’n 2005 Antitrust Law Section
Symposium: Empagran and the International Reach of U.S. Antitrust Laws (Jan. 27, 2005)) ;
Waller, Courtroom, supra note 7, at 524-25 (“The courts do not understand the FTAIA. Almost
all of the opinions are simply wrong or they reach the right result for the wrong reason. As a
result, the courts are botching the Congressional purpose underlying the statute and
misconstruing the proper role of antitrust in foreign commerce cases, particularly global cartel
cases.”).
28. See United States v. Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 758-59 (9th Cir. 2015) (relying on Ninth
Circuit precedent that a “direct” effect as contemplated by the FTAIA is a domestic effect that
“follows as an immediate consequence of the defendant[s’] activity.”); United States v. LSL
Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004) (drawing interpretation of the FTAIA’s “direct . . .
effect” requirement from the US Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act’s “direct effect” term declared in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504
U.S. 607, 618 (1992)).
29. See Lotes, 753 F.3d at 410-11 (citing Minn-Chem to reject the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of the FTAIA’s “direct . . . effect” requirement as drawing from an inappropriate
similarity with another US statute); Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 856-57 (adopting the interpretation
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The most recent appellate decision involving the FTAIA, Motorola
Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., has contributed to the statute’s
confusion.30 There, the Seventh Circuit held that a US parent company
failed to show that it suffered direct injury as a result of foreign
anticompetitive conduct, despite the fact that price-fixed component
products were purchased by its majority-owned foreign subsidiaries to
be incorporated into final products purchased by the US parent and sold
to US customers.31
Nevertheless, various delineations already exist that suggest a
solution to the inconsistency is attainable and may be designed to
enhance global antitrust enforcement through greater availability of
worldwide private redress. What is apparent from the succession of
decisions from Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California32 to F.
Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (Empagran)33 is that the
FTAIA grey area has been sufficiently tapered to allow for the return
of a comity balancing test to appropriately reconcile the conflicting
interests at hand in the residual universe of cases.34 This Note argues
that Hartford Fire, its progeny, and Empagran form confining
parameters on the applicability of the FTAIA, namely that cases that
do not involve a US party, domestic effect, and domestic injury arising
from that effect will fail the FTAIA’s exemption test. Moreover,
because the FTAIA’s “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable”
effect test can be construed as a proxy for the United States’
prescriptive jurisdiction interest, comity analysis is helpful in its

of “direct” in the FTAIA proposed by the US Department of Justice as being more consistent
with the language of the statute than the Ninth Circuit’s competing interpretations).
30. 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015). This Note
recognizes that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European
Community may have implications for extraterritorial application of US antitrust laws by noting
that the private right to action in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(“RICO”) was modeled after US antitrust law’s private right of action in Section 4 of the Clayton
Act before holding that RICO’s private right of action requires domestic injury. See 136 S. Ct.
2090, 2111 (2016); supra note 7. However, because the decision ultimately decided a question
connected with RICO and because the Supreme Court to date has refrained from hearing cases
related to antitrust extraterritoriality after Empagran, this Note does not provide commentary on
RJR Nabisco. See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015)
(declining to take the Motorola Mobility appeal from the Seventh Circuit); infra § III.B.3.
31. Id.
32. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
33. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
34. See infra § V.
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interpretation.35 Thus, claims which are based on exclusively non-US
conduct that questionably has a “direct effect” on US commerce
resulting in the plaintiff’s injury are more properly decided not by the
courts’ current focus on statutory interpretation, but rather by a
Timberlane-style ad hoc fact-intensive balancing test that contemplates
factors more suitable to the modern global economy and promoting
international dialogue.36
In sum, this Note proposes the introduction of a new international
comity balancing test into US antitrust jurisprudence with the aim of
fostering and strengthening global antitrust enforcement and private
redress. It does so in four parts. Following this introduction, Part II
briefly summarizes the expansion of US antitrust extraterritorial
application. Next, Part III discusses various developments undertaken
to limit and demarcate the reach of US antitrust law. Part IV raises
issues arising from those efforts that have resulted in inconsistent and
questionable holdings. Finally in Part V, by analyzing and synthesizing
the existing precedent, this Note contends that a judicial international
comity balancing test would most appropriately determine the
propriety of US antitrust extraterritoriality for particular types of
private recompense cases that are problematic under the current
framework.

35. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164-65 (asserting while construing the FTAIA that the rule
of construing ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority
of other nations as a principle of customary international law “assumes that legislators take
account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they write American laws . .
. [which] helps the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work together in harmony –
a harmony particularly needed in today’s highly interdependent commercial world.”); Motorola
Mobility, 775 F.3d at 818 (“[The FTAIA] has been interpreted, for reasons of international
comity . . . , to limit the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law.”); Japan Motorola Brief,
supra note 3, at 4-5 (“The [FTAIA] was intended to prevent such ‘unreasonable interference
with the sovereign authority of other nations.’” (citing Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164)).
36. It should be noted that this Note does not consider procedural issues associated with
extraterritoriality such as personal jurisdiction, venue, and forum non conveniens. Additionally,
it does not discuss whether the FTAIA, properly understood, addresses the question of courts’
subject matter jurisdiction or, alternatively, whether it spells out a prima facie element in an
antitrust claim. See Lotes, 753 F.3d at 398 (“We hold that . . . the requirements of the FTAIA
are substantive and non-jurisdictional in nature. Because Congress has not ‘clearly state[d]’ . . .
that these requirements are jurisdictional, they go to the merits of the claim rather than the
adjudicative power of the court.”); Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 851-53 (establishing that FTAIA
addresses “conduct” to which the Sherman Act applies and thus refers to the element of a claim
rather than subject-matter jurisdiction).
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II. THE SHERMAN ACT’S EXTRATERRITORIAL EXPANSION
The narrative of the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial evolution
begins with American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., where Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes’ opinion initially established strict territoriality
for the question of whether the statute governed foreign conduct.37
Deciding whether an American plaintiff was entitled to redress for
anticompetitive conduct and resulting injury that occurred entirely
outside of the United States, Holmes observed that “the general and
almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done.”38 Holmes’ analysis embodied a tension inherent in prescriptive
jurisdiction between a state’s authority to have absolute and exclusive
jurisdiction within its territory and a state’s authority to protect its
citizens from harmful external conduct undertaken abroad.39 The
former precept is known as the “territorial principle,” whereas the latter
reflects its objective application, otherwise known as “objective
territoriality.”40 In direct opposition to the territorial principle,
objective territoriality dictates that “one state may share concurrent
jurisdiction with another state.”41
37. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). In American Banana, a US plaintiff brought suit under the
Sherman Act to recover from a defendant who had allegedly influenced a foreign government
to seize plaintiff’s properties.
38. Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 355-56 (distinguishing instances where harmful conduct
occurs in regions subject to no sovereign, such as piracy on the high seas, where extraterritorial
application of domestic laws would be proper).
39. Prescriptive jurisdiction, also known as legislative jurisdiction, refers to the authority
of a state to make its law applicable to persons or activities. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 813
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing legislative jurisdiction, or “jurisdiction to prescribe”);
Popofsky, supra note 15, at 2418 (defining prescriptive jurisdiction as “the scope of a state’s
power to regulate conduct.”). International law traditionally recognizes four predicates of
prescriptive jurisdiction: (1) territorial principle – jurisdiction over all conduct within the
prescribing state’s territory; (2) nationality principle – jurisdiction over all conduct of the
prescribing state’s citizenry, including conduct beyond the state’s borders; (3) protective
principle – jurisdiction over external conduct directed at the prescribing state’s security or the
interests; and (4) universality principle – jurisdiction over universally condemned conduct as a
matter of public international law, such as piracy or slave trade. See BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED
STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 82 (2d
ed. Supp. 1993) (expounding the concept of prescriptive jurisdiction).
40. See Popofsky, supra note 15, at 2418-20 (discussing the bases for prescriptive
jurisdiction); Dodge, supra note 2, at 130 (same).
41. Popofsky, supra note 15, at 2419 (explaining the difference between the territorial
principle and its objective application) (emphasis in original); see also Laker Airways, 731 F.2d
at 922-23 (discussing the objective application of territorial jurisdiction as being entirely
consistent with internationally recognized limits on sovereign authority).
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While the court decided this tension in favor of finding
jurisdiction based on pure territoriality, it faced a question of whether
a US plaintiff harmed abroad by foreign conduct arguably taken at the
behest of a foreign sovereign suffered a cognizable injury under the
Sherman Act. Decisions immediately following American Banana,
however, began to stretch the reach of pure territoriality jurisdiction to
foreign conduct so long as there existed some substantial in-US
conduct to serve as a predicate for the Sherman Act’s applicability.42
When globalization began to develop in the 1920s, national interest
pressures on doctrine started to mount as the international cartel
movement complicated relationships across borders.43
A. Alcoa and the Effects Doctrine
Legal doctrine undergirding extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act was fundamentally altered by Judge Learned Hand’s
1945 opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa).44
42. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) (finding that the
Sherman Act applied to an illegal agreement executed in England to divide world markets that
kept an American firm out of the British market and a British firm out of the American market);
United States v. Pac. & Artic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913) (rejecting the argument
that the Sherman Act was inapplicable to transportation routes between the United States and
Canada on the grounds that the conduct occurred partially within the United States); see also
Popofksy, supra note 15, at 2420-21 (detailing reactions and cases following American Banana).
43. See Diamond, supra note 12, at 811 (narrating the growth of globalization and the
international cartel movement in the early part of the twentieth century); Jeremy C. Bates,
Comment, Home Is Where the Hurt Is: Forum Non Conveniens and Antitrust, 2000 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 281, 317 (2000) (demonstrating that US national interest shaped the doctrine
underlying the applicability of US antitrust law during growth of globalization in the early
twentieth century); see also RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA:
HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 75-89 (rev. ed. 1996) (discussing the cooperative competition
movement and the rise of encouraged trade associations during the 1920s).
44. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); see also Snell, supra note 16, at 246-47 (explaining that
Alcoa forced reconsideration of traditional notions of national sovereignty by expanding the
concept of territory). Of note, during a time in which cases involving the Sherman Act were
appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court, the case was referred to the Second Circuit
after four Supreme Court justices recused themselves. PERITZ, supra note 43, at 363 n.128
(recounting the circumstances leading to the Second Circuit hearing and deciding Alcoa); James
M. Anderson, Eric Helland & Merritt McAlister, Measuring How Stock Ownership Affects
Which Judges and Justices Hear Cases, 103 GEO. L.J. 1163, 1176 n.76 (2015) (same). The
Supreme Court later explicitly approved the decision in Am. Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S.
781 (1946). 1 SPENCER WEBER WALLER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 6-12
n.12 (3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter WALLER, AMERICAN BUSINESS] (noting that the Supreme Court
in Am. Tobacco observed that Alcoa “was decided . . . under unique circumstances which add to
its weight as a precedent.”); PERITZ, supra note 43, at 363 n.128 (explaining that when approving
Alcoa the Supreme Court cited extensive passages from Alcoa in its Am. Tobacco decision).
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By the time the Second Circuit heard Alcoa, objective territoriality
doctrinally began to realize widespread acceptance, due in part to the
utility of the Sherman Act in thwarting enemy misconduct in US
wartime industry during both World Wars.45 In deciding the case,
Judge Learned Hand recognized the question facing the Second Circuit
in Alcoa was manifestly different from the question analyzed by Justice
Holmes.46 Specifically, Alcoa involved Alcoa’s Canadian subsidiary
participating in an international cartel on Alcoa’s behalf to fix
aluminum prices worldwide, but where none of the conduct occurred
within US boundaries.47 Accepting Holmes’ axiom from American
Banana that courts “should not impute to Congress an intent to punish
all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences
within the United States,” Hand distinguished cases with conduct that
intended substantial effects in the United States.48 Hand observed that
“it is settled law . . . that any state may impose liabilities, even upon
persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that
has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and
these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize.”49 The court
accordingly held that when conduct causes an intended effect on US
commerce, such conduct is within the Sherman Act’s regulatory
grasp.50
Alcoa thus launched objective territoriality via the effects doctrine
into US antitrust jurisprudence and began an era of aggressive
extraterritorial enforcement.51 The effects doctrine articulated by Alcoa
45. See Popofsky, supra note 15, at 2421 (chronicling the events leading up to Alcoa,
particularly during the Second World War); Richard M. Steuer & Peter A. Barile III, Antitrust
in Wartime, 16 ANTITRUST 71, 71-73 (2002) (same); First, supra note 16, at 728-30 (same);
Thomas K. Fisher, Antitrust During National Emergencies, 40 MICH. L. REV. 969, 988-89
(1942) (describing the use of antitrust enforcement during World War One).
46. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443-44 (elaborating on the distinction between American Banana’s
territorial doctrine and the facts at hand in Alcoa); Popofsky, supra note 15, at 2422
(summarizing Judge Hand’s approach to framing the question in Alcoa).
47. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 421-22, 442-43 (discussing the nature of the anticompetitive
conduct in the dispute).
48. Id. at 443-44 (highlighting that the domestic US effect intended by defendant’s foreign
conduct removed it from the auspices of American Banana and drew similarity to subsequent
cases, such as Pacific & Artic and United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927)).
49. Id. at 443.
50. See id. at 443-44 (establishing that conduct intending to affect US imports stood as
sufficient reason to apply US law to cross-border conduct).
51. See, e.g., Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (holding that a lower court should not
have refused to exercise Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign reinsurers under principles of
international comity because foreign law was not in direct conflict with US law); Pfizer, 434
U.S. 308 (1978) (concluding that a foreign nation is a “person” under Section 4 of the Clayton
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and its progeny establishes national jurisdiction over conduct that has
an intentional or foreseeable effect on the nation’s commerce where the
effect is substantial.52 Subsequent cases expanded on the application of
the effects doctrine, including questions regarding segmenting
conspiracies by location of the injury and the nationality of the
plaintiffs.53 The former question was decided in Continental Ore Co. v.
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., in which the Court found that a
domestic plaintiff was entitled to combine claims of domestic and
foreign injury so long as they were part of the same conspiracy.54
Specifically, the Court held that “the character and effect of a
conspiracy are not to be judged by dismembering it and viewing its
separate parts, but only by looking at it as a whole.”55
With respect to foreign plaintiffs, the Supreme Court opined in
Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India that though American consumers
are the main object of the Sherman Act’s protection, US antitrust law
also entitles foreign parties to seek redress for antitrust injury because
“foreigners who have been victimized by antitrust violations clearly

Act and thus entitled to sue for treble damages under the antitrust laws to the same extent as any
other plaintiff); Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (finding
in part that a conspiracy to monopolize or restrain domestic or foreign commerce of the United
States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part of the conspiracy is
conducted in foreign countries); United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 1997) (holding that cartel activities committed abroad that have a substantial and intended
effect within the United States may form the basis for criminal prosecution under the Sherman
Act); see also Wood, supra note 1, at 298 (attributing aggressive extraterritorial enforcement to
a number of factors, including increased global business activity, the economic and political
dominance of the United States, American acceptance of the effects doctrine, and lack of
international machinery to address genuine transnational competition problems).
52. See MARK R. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER: A GUIDE TO THE
OPERATION OF UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN UNION AND OTHER KEY COMPETITION LAWS IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 44 (3d ed. 2006) (describing the implications of the effects doctrine);
Snell, supra note 16, at 246-47 (same).
53. See generally Cont’l Ore Co., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (holding that the character and
effect of a price-fixing conspiracy should be judged as a whole and not dismembered and viewed
in separate parts); Pfizer, 434 U.S. 308 (1978) (holding that a foreign nation had standing to sue
for treble damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act).
54. 370 U.S. at 704 (“A conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign
commerce of the United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part of
the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries.”). As will be later discussed, the Court
did an about-face on this question when deciding Empagran by interpreting the FTAIA through
comity principles. See infra §§ III, IV.
55. Cont’l Ore Co., 370 U.S. at 699 (quoting United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 544
(1913)).
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may contribute to the protection of American consumers.”56 While the
main question decided by Pfizer was whether a foreign sovereign was
a “person” as contemplated by the Clayton Act and thus entitled to seek
redress for harmful anticompetitive conduct, the decision has been
understood as affording foreign purchasers the protection of US
antitrust laws when harmed by US conduct.57 Subsequent lower court
opinions have followed the Supreme Court’s observation, also noting
that foreign parties relying on US laws to transact with American
parties are entitled to the protection of those laws.58
The effects doctrine continued to be embraced in US courts
through the 1990s, notably in the Supreme Court’s decision of Hartford
Fire and in the First Circuit’s United States v. Nippon Paper Industries
Co., Ltd., in which the doctrine was applied in a criminal action.59 In
Hartford Fire, US plaintiffs alleged boycott conspiracies in the US
reinsurance market between American and British conspirators.60
Noting that “it is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies
to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce
some substantial effect in the United States,” the Supreme Court
shrugged off an international comity defense and held that the British
defendants were properly subject to the Sherman Act.61
56. 434 U.S. at 314 (assessing the authority of foreign purchasers to recover treble
damages from an American defendant under Section 4 of the Clayton Act for Sherman Act
violations affecting foreign countries).
57. Id. at 311-12 (describing the legal issue on appeal); WALLER, AMERICAN BUSINESS,
supra note 44, at 9-34-9-35 (discussing arguments for Pfizer supporting “the proposition that
the Sherman Act condemns restraints imposed by American firms from the United States on
foreign consumers.”); Salil K. Mehra, Deterrence: The Private Remedy and International
Antitrust Cases, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 275, 297, 297 n.88 (2002) (“Both the sponsor of
the FTAIA and commentators on the bill understood that the bill did not reject Pfizer or its
endorsement of standing for foreign parties under federal antitrust laws.”); see also Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1981: Hearings on H.R. 2326 Before the Subcommittee on
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 111, 113 (1981)
(statement of Martin F. Connor, Washington Corporate Counsel, General Electric Co.)
[hereinafter 1981 FTAIA Hearings] (including statement of Business Roundtable to the effect
that the bill containing the FTAIA was not a substitute for legislation to modify Pfizer that was
being considered simultaneously).
58. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 943 (observing that as a foreign corporation operating
within the United States plaintiff is entitled to the protection of US antitrust laws); Transor
(Bermuda), Ltd. v. BP North American Petroleum, 666 F. Supp. 581, 584-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(following Pfizer to hold that Bermudian victims of anticompetitive behavior affecting a
primarily US market have standing to assert US antitrust claims).
59. 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
60. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 773-78 (recounting the facts of the case).
61. Id. at 796 (citing prior holdings by the court that subjected defendants to US
competition scrutiny where there were substantial intended effects on US commerce: Matsushita
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In the Nippon Paper case, the United States Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) charged Nippon Paper with entering into a price-fixing
agreement with other thermal fax competitors in Japan to raise the price
of the paper exported to the United States.62 Nippon Paper was accused
of having sold thermal fax paper to two trading companies in Japan for
export to the United States, but none of the conduct was alleged to have
occurred in the United States. Refusing to distinguish between civil and
criminal cases, the First Circuit followed Hartford Fire’s reaffirmation
of the effects doctrine and held that the Sherman Act applies to wholly
foreign conduct that has an intended and substantial effect in the United
States.63 By adopting the Supreme Court’s approach in Hartford Fire,
Nippon Paper was believed to have cemented the effects doctrine as
the controlling test for Sherman Act extraterritoriality.64
B. Reasons to Extend the Sherman Act Abroad
In part, the United States’ adoption of the effects doctrine and the
extraterritorial expansion of Sherman Act applicability was a protective

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 n.6 (1986); Cont’l Ore Co., 370 U.S.
at 704; Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288 (1952); Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. at
275-76; Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444).
62. See Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 2 (relaying the factual account from the indictment).
63. Id. at 4 (establishing that the effects doctrine applies both to civil and criminal
scenarios due to section one of the Sherman Act’s undiscerning language). Two years after
Nippon Paper, Japan and the United States would sign the Agreement Between the Government
of the United States and the Government of Japan Concerning Cooperation in Anticompetitive
Activities to address enforcement coordination and international comity. See generally
Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan
Concerning Cooperation in Anticompetitive Activities, Oct. 7, 1999, U.S.-Japan,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/agreement-between-government-united-states-america-andgovernment-japan-concerning-cooperation [https://perma.cc/32UG-GAQY] (last visited Oct.
26, 2017) (antitrust cooperation agreement between the United States and Japan noting that “the
sound and effective enforcement of competition laws of each country would be enhanced by
cooperation and, where appropriate, coordination between the Parties in the application of those
laws”). For more detailed information on the bilateral agreement and the surrounding
circumstances, see generally Cooper, supra note 6 (analyzing the antitrust cooperation
agreement between the two countries). See infra § III.A.2.
64. See, e.g., First, supra note 16, at 723 (“[Nippon Paper] is more appropriately viewed
as one that actually closes a chapter on the territorial controversies of the last three decades of
antitrust law . . . [and] confirms that we have now moved to a general acceptance of what had
previously been labeled ‘extraterritorial’ jurisdiction.”). See also Spencer Weber Waller, The
Twilight of Comity, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 563, 569 (2000) [hereinafter Waller, Twilight]
(explaining that Hartford Fire “virtually eliminated” international comity as a meaningful
restraint on the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act).

2017]

INTERNATIONAL COMITY BALANCING TEST

245

measure.65 As global enterprise became the new norm for national
economies, an international mechanism was needed to address genuine
transnational competition problems.66 Because national antitrust laws
partly exist to protect domestic markets and consumers, proponents of
extraterritoriality argue that the law must then apply to those causing
domestic harm externally in order to adequately serve that purpose.67
Globally, major antitrust jurisdictions have agreed protection is
best attained through cross-border application of domestic laws. The
EC established extraterritorial application of the EEC Treaty Article 85
(now TFEU 101), Sherman Act Section 1’s counterpart, in its 1988
Woodpulp decision.68 There, the EC decided it was necessary to extend
jurisdiction over a cartel of producers located outside the European
Union to avoid affording offenders of EU competition law “an easy
means of evading those prohibitions.”69 Apart from the United States
and the European Union, a number of other jurisdictions have also
65. See Eleanor Fox, Witness Statement Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission,
Hearings on International Antitrust Issues 2 (Feb. 15, 2006), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/
commission_hearings/pdf/Statement_Fox_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/M88U-68G6] (archived
Oct. 26, 2017) [hereinafter Fox, AMC Hearing] (stating that most antitrust jurisdictions have
adopted some form of the effects doctrine to protect themselves, the absence of which would
necessitate an international antitrust regime); see also Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd v Comm’n,
1999 E.C.R. II-0753 (embracing the effects doctrine in the EU by stating that the application of
EU regulations to a merger between companies located outside EU territory “is justified under
public international law when it is foreseeable that a proposed concentration will have an
immediate and substantial effect in the Community.”).
66. See Wood, supra note 1, at 298 (explaining that US adoption of the effects doctrine
was borne out of increasing transnational business activity); John A. Trenor, Jurisdiction and
the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws After Hartford Fire, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583,
1600 (1995) (stating that American Banana’s standard of strict territoriality grew increasingly
unacceptable given the rise of internationalized markets); see also Joelson & Griffin, supra note
16, at 16-17 (highlighting that an international mechanism governing transnational enterprises
does not yet exist in part due to differences in national policies concerned with protecting
domestic markets and industry).
67. See, e.g., Brief for Economists Joseph E. Stiglitz and Peter R. Orszag as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 2, F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004)
(No. 03-724) [hereinafter Stiglitz & Orszag Brief] (arguing that extraterritorial application of
the Sherman Act in private litigation helps protect American consumers against the potential
harms of international cartels); Trenor, supra note 66, at 1600 (“However, the application of
[strict territoriality in American Banana] failed to further the central policy behind antitrust laws:
protecting US markets from anticompetitive behavior.”).
68. Case C-89/85, Ahlström Osakeyhtiö & Ors v. Comm’n (Woodpulp), 1988 E.C.R. 5193
(establishing the effects doctrine in the EU); Gencor, 1999 E.C.R. II-0753 (following
Woodpulp); First, supra note 16, at 726 (discussing the EC’s extraterritorial extension of EU
competition law beginning with Woodpulp).
69. See Woodpulp, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, ¶ 16 (observing that restricting Article 85 to conduct
occurring within the EU would afford offenders “an easy means of evading those prohibitions.”).
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extended the reach of their own antitrust laws, including Austria,
Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and
Switzerland.70
Protection under antitrust law is principally realized through
deterrence and redress objectives.71 Deterring anticompetitive conduct
is achieved through criminalizing conduct and allowing for the
recovery of treble damages in private litigation.72 In regard to private
litigation, supporters of extraterritorial application highlight the
powerful deterrent effect of treble damage recovery in removing the
ability of international cartelists to subsidize US operations through
foreign cartel profits even in the face of domestic liability.73

70. HAWK, supra note 39, at 87-88 (listing countries that have accepted some variation of
the effects doctrine as a basis of antitrust jurisdiction); Waller, Twilight, supra note 64, at 57475 (discussing other countries that have undertaken cross-border application of national antitrust
laws); John Terzaken, Antitrust Enforcement Goes Global, REUTERS (Nov. 22, 2013),
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/11/22/antitrust-enforcement-goes-global
[https://perma.cc/D73R-VY5R] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (noting countries engaged in
extraterritorial anti-cartel prosecutions).
71. See Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 314 (noting that allowing private parties to sue under US
antitrust law to recover harm threefold serves two purposes: “to deter violators and deprive them
of ‘the fruits of their illegality,’ and ‘to compensate victims of antitrust violations for their
injuries.’”); Antitrust Modernization Comm’n, Report and Recommendations 241-42 (Apr.
2007), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/toc.htm [https://perma.cc/
TT9K-52QP] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (describing US antitrust law’s public-private
enforcement framework); see generally Stiglitz & Orszag Brief, supra note 67 (arguing that
deterrence achieved through broader US antitrust jurisdiction best protects American consumers
from global cartels).
72. See Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 314-15 (explaining that granting standing to foreign plaintiffs
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, and with it the availability of treble damages, furthers the
deterrence purposes of US antitrust law by stripping cartelists of the ability to offset domestic
liability with illicit gains made in foreign markets); Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d
384, 403 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Pfizer for the proposition that American markets can benefit from
the additional deterrence associated with allowing plaintiffs to sue for foreign harm caused by
conduct that negatively affects American markets); Den Norske Stats Olkeselskap AS v.
HeereMac v.o.f., 241 F.3d 420, 434-35 (5th Cir. 2001) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (opining
that barring foreign plaintiffs to bring suit in US court for claims arising from global cartel
conspiracies affecting the United States lessens the deterrent effect of US treble damages); see
generally Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. Hammond & Belinda A. Barnett, Deterrence and
Detection of Cartels: Using All the Tools and Sanctions, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 207 (2011)
(evaluating the deterrence mechanisms of American antitrust enforcement).
73. See Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 435 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the
importance of deterring global cartel activity by completely depriving cartelists of price-fixing
benefits for adequate protection of markets). See also Stiglitz & Orszag Brief, supra note 67, at
6-8 (explaining the need to eliminate a cartel’s expected global profits to effectively deter global
cartels).
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Indeed, antitrust regimes outside of the United States are
increasingly recognizing that effective enforcement is costly and, thus,
private actions for damages notwithstanding trebling bolsters
enforcement without greater public expenditure.74 This recognition is
underscored by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) in its 2001
Courage v Crehan decision:
The full effectiveness of Article [101] of the [TFEU] and, in
particular, the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in
Article [101(1)] would be put at risk if it were not open to any
individual to claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract
or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition. Indeed, the
existence of such a right strengthens the working of the
Community competition rules and discourages agreement or
practices . . . which are liable to restrict or distort competition.
From that point of view, actions for damages before the national
courts can make a significant contribution to the maintenance of
effective competition in the Community.75

As a result, governments around the globe have increasingly
initiated or bolstered the ability for private parties to recover from
harms created by unlawful anticompetitive over the past ten years. The
ECJ’s sentiments can most readily be associated with the EC’s decision
in 2014 to issue Directive 2014/104/EU, which required EU member
states to enact legislation providing for private rights of action at the
national level within two years of the Directive’s promulgation.76 The
EC Directive was the culmination of “wide spread support in Europe
for the principle that legal and natural persons who suffered a loss as a

74. See Pheasant, supra note 11, at 59 (“In the [EC]’s view, any increase in private
litigation . . . would serve the purpose of more effective antitrust enforcement without placing
greater strains on the public purpose); Maria Teresa Vanikiotis, Note, Private Antitrust
Enforcement and Tentative Steps Toward Collective Redress in Europe and the United Kingdom,
37 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1639, 1642-43 (2014) (introducing dialogue in the United Kingdom
and Europe on implementing mechanisms for collective private antitrust redress that indicates
authorities believe current private enforcement requires strengthening); supra note 17.
75. Case C-453/99, Courage v Crehan, 2001 E.C.R. I-6297, ¶¶ 26, 27.
76. See Directive 2014/104/EU (addressing the creation of private rights of action in
Member States, including prescribed procedural rules, party standing, damages calculations, and
interaction with the EC’s leniency program); Joaquín Almunia, V.P. of the Eur. Comm’n,
Fighting Against Cartels: A Priority for the Present and for the Future, Address Before SV
Kartellrecht (Apr. 3, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-281_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/K43W-SKMN] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (describing generally the EC
Directive and its effect on overall cartel enforcement).
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result of an antitrust infringement should be entitled to recover
damages to compensate them for that loss.”77
Brazil presents another example of a jurisdiction seeking to have
an expanded private enforcement regime complement its public
enforcement efforts.78 In lieu of treble damages or other incentives for
pursuing private recovery, the Brazil’s Administrative Council of
Economic Defence (“CADE”) has searched for new and more effective
ways to encourage victims to claim damages collectively with the
object to amplify the deterrent effect of CADE’s decisions.79 This has
involved delivering agency judgments to trade confederations and
associations so that any interested parties might be notified of the
potential for pursuing recovery, drafting administrative bylaws that
allows effective compensation of anticompetitive harms at lower costs
to the aggrieved parties, and joining private litigation as an amicus
curiae to provide its view of Brazil’s Competition Law in an effort to
influence decisions.80
Other countries have also sought to expand private enforcement
through expansions of class action-style recovery, such as Israel and
the United Kingdom.81 In 2006, Israel enacted its Class Actions Law,
77. Almunia, supra note 76, at 2 (stating that the EC Directive was proposed to reach “out
to victims of antitrust infringements so that they can obtain compensation for the harm they
suffered.”); Pheasant, supra note 11, at 59 (introducing the debate preceding the eventual
adoption of a European private right of action); supra note 11 and accompanying text.
78. Carlos Francisco de Magalhães, Gabriel Nogueria Dias & Cristiano Rodrigo Del
Debbio, Brazil, in THE PRIVATE COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT REVIEW 52 (Ilene Knable Gotts
ed., 6th ed. 2013) (summarizing recent efforts to expand private enforcement in Brazil); Org. for
Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Latin American and Caribbean Competition Forum – Session I:
Cartels: Estimation of Harm in Public Enforcement Actions 7 (Mar. 19, 2017),
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/LACF(2017)21/en/pdf
[https://perma.cc/U238EYGG] (archived Oct. 26, 2017) (highlighting that a goal of Brazil’s competition authority has
been to foster private antitrust damages actions).
79. De Magalhães et al., supra note 78, at 52 (discussing the Brazilian competition
authority’s efforts in provoking private litigation as a means of enforcement); CADE Submits
for Public Consultation Bylaw on Procedures Related to Access to Documents from the Antitrust
Investigations, ADMIN. COUNCIL FOR ECON. DEF. (Dec. 14, 2016), http://en.cade.gov.br/pressreleases/cade-submits-for-public-consultation-resolution-on-procedures-related-to-the-accessto-documents-from-the-antitrust-investigations [https://perma.cc/WPH2-7XRS] (archived Oct.
26, 2017) [hereinafter CADE Press Release] (announcing the submission of an administrative
bylaw that aims to encourage private follow-on lawsuits to public prosecutions).
80. De Magalhães et al., supra note 78, at 52 (offering examples of how CADE has spurred
private parties to pursue litigation in Brazil). CADE Press Release (explaining a proposed bylaw
that would encourage antitrust victims to seek recovery by lowering administrative fines and
limiting exposure to private liability for cartelists participating in investigatory efforts in
addition to facilitating greater access to the fruits of CADE investigations).
81. See supra note 18.
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under which private antitrust actions may be brought.82 The statute
provides for collective recovery for violations of certain laws,
including antitrust violations, by either a group of private class
members that raise common substantive questions of fact or law, a
public authority on behalf of a class, or an organization on behalf of
class members within the sphere of one of the organization’s public
purposes.83 As a result, Israel has experienced a sharp increase in
private antitrust litigation, notably with respect to international
cartels.84
The United Kingdom recently enacted the Consumer Rights Act
2015, which, among other adjustments, makes changes to the
Competition Act 199885 to facilitate recovery actions by private victims
of proscribed anticompetitive conduct.86 For instance, the statute
extends the time purchasers have to bring claims from two years to six
years.87 In addition, the statute introduces a new type of collective
action suit that requires class members to “opt out” to complement “opt
in” actions, the former of which provides greater strength in numbers
to encourage quick compensatory resolutions.88
Equally important to effective enforcement is providing relief for
victims of anticompetitive conduct.89 Remedies for harm created by an
82. See Class Actions Law, § 1(1) (establishing class action recovery in part for those
private parties that would find it difficult to seek redress as individuals); David E. Tadmor &
Shai Bakal, Israel, in GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 2017 76
(Samantha Mobley ed., 2016) (describing class actions in Israel).
83. Class Actions Law, § 4 (setting forth the persons entitled to petition the court for class
action approval). See also Tadmor & Bakal, supra note 82, at 76 (“The Class Actions Law
provides that a person, public entity, or consumers’ organization may, under certain conditions,
file a class action on behalf of a class of plaintiffs and seek damages for breach of [Israel’s
antitrust law].”).
84. Tadmor & Bakal, supra note 82, at 76 (summarizing the development of private
antitrust litigation in Israel); Ido Baum, Who Profits from Class Actions Suits? Not You,
HAARETZ (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/.premium1.632671?=&ts=_1502369885185 [https://perma.cc/Q8MC-NB2J] (archived Oct. 26, 2017)
(following a study that analyzed the increase of class actions suits since the Class Actions Law).
85. The Competition Act 1998, c. 41 (Eng.) (the UK’s current major source of antitrust
law).
86. See CRA 2015, § 81 (setting out modifications to the Competition Act 1998 for private
actions); see also Hodge, supra note 18 (highlighting changes made by CRA 2015).
87. See CRA 2015, § 81.8 (outlining changes to limitation and prescriptive periods
associated with certain types of actions); see also Hodge, supra note 18 (noting the increase in
the limitation period).
88. See CRA 2015, § 81.5(11) (defining “Opt-out collective proceedings”); Hodge, supra
note 18 (detailing ramifications of opt-out actions).
89. See generally Fox, Remedies, supra note 14 (stressing the global necessity of remedies
while evaluating how “the law, the quest of competitiveness, and the perceived interests of
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antitrust violation are needed on both micro and macro levels.90 These
include restoring a competitive environment, compensating victims,
correcting the conditions facilitating the anticompetitive behavior, and
incentivizing adherence to the law.91 While perfect relief is impossible,
effective relief for purchasers harmed by foreign antitrust perpetrators
may only be achieved in some cases through extraterritorial application
of antitrust law.92 Advocates of such measures maintain that the United
States should not compromise its law on comity grounds just because
a foreign state’s law may have tolerated or even sanctioned the cartel.93
III. EFFORTS TO LIMIT THE SHERMAN ACT’S CROSS-BORDER
APPLICATION
Though the deterrence and redress achieved through Alcoa’s
effects doctrine seemingly justify its place in US jurisprudence, the
doctrine has been subject to three main criticisms.94 First, critics have
argued that the effects doctrine is contrary to established principles of
international law, which at the time were firmly based on pure

nations are creating retrenchment and suboptimal remedies.”); see, e.g., Pheasant, supra note
11, at 59 (noting that the debate preceding the private right to sue in the EU was led by
widespread support for compensating private loss); Cavanagh, Lessons, supra note 8, at 631
(explaining that allowing private actions ensures that victims are fairly compensated because
public enforcement actions do not provide monetary recovery for individual losses).
90. Fox, Remedies, supra note 14, at 573 (defining the micro goal as correcting the market
failure, reestablishing competition, and compensating victims and defining the macro goal as
structuring incentives to minimize the recurrence of the anticompetitive conduct); Cavanagh,
Lessons, supra note 8, at 631-36 (describing the remedial objectives of private actions under US
antitrust law).
91. Fox, Remedies, supra note 14, at 573 (enumerating the objectives of antitrust
remedies); Cavanagh, Lessons, supra note 8, at 631-36 (same).
92. See, e.g., Woodpulp, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, ¶ 16 (noting that if applicability of EU
competition law was restricted by the territorial confines of the European Community, violators
could easily evade the established prohibitions); Fox, Remedies, supra note 14, at 581-82
(arguing that the recent trend in judicial narrowing of US antitrust jurisdiction is at odds with
the need for stronger remedies).
93. See Fox, Remedies, supra note 14, at 577 (announcing that the US Supreme Courts’
decision in Hartford Fire met the “test of courage of convictions” by applying the Sherman Act
extraterritorially amid “other nations’ pleas on behalf of ‘their’ firms.”); see, e.g., First, supra
note 16, at 726 (illustrating that the EC took the same approach in Woodpulp when it decided it
had jurisdiction over an international cartel that included an American firm exempted from US
antitrust law).
94. See HAWK, supra note 399, at 111-12 (describing critique of the effects doctrine). See
also WALLER, AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 6-22ff (discussing challenges levied by
foreign governments and commentators accusing Alcoa’s holding of “going beyond both the
practice of nations and American precedent.”).
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territoriality.95 Second, critics have pointed out that the effects doctrine
does not take into account foreign interests.96 The failure to account for
these interests, critics argue, enables courts to mask the true reasons
underlying their decisions or to openly slight foreign interests.97
Finally, critics have complained that Alcoa’s effects test has lacked
clarity and predictability.98 In particular, lower courts have
reformulated the test from an intent and effect test to either a direct and
substantial effect test or have only required fictional general intent.99
95. See WALLER, AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 6-25 (highlighting that Alcoa’s
effects test may not have met the normal exception to the general presumption of territoriality
nor did it follow the recognized principles of comity, which leaves regulation of conduct to the
state with the primary interest); HAWK, supra note 39, at 111 (conceding that Hand overstated
the acceptance of the effects doctrine when he announced it as “settled law”).
Professor Barry Hawk, however, finds this point to be unpersuasive, contending that
whether Alcoa’s effects test was inconsistent with contemporaneous international law is
irrelevant because it is now consistent with current state practice and international law. HAWK,
supra note 39, at 111 (“[W]hether or not the effects doctrine as adopted in Alcoa was consistent
with international law at the time of the decision in 1945, the effects doctrine as a basis for
antitrust jurisdiction is consistent with the trend in state practice and today is not contrary to
international law.”).
96. WALLER, AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 6-24-6-25 (contending that another
weakness of Alcoa’s adoption of the effects test was “its perceived failure to take into account
the possible legitimate interests of other nations affected by an exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.”); HAWK, supra note 39, at 111 (declaring as a more “facially attractive” criticism
that Hand’s “intent and effect test does not encompass an explicit recognition of foreign
interests,” nor does it have a doctrinal handle to ensure that those interests may be weighed).
97. WALLER, AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 6-26 (“To minimize conflict and
resentment, [foreign interests] ideally should have been brought to bear at the time an antitrust
court was deciding whether it had jurisdiction to apply United States laws.”); HAWK, supra note
39, at 111 (stating that Alcoa’s failure to recognize foreign interests lead to the Ninth Circuit’s
adoption of a “balancing of interests” test in 1976).
Others, on the other hand, argue that disregarding foreign interests is not only the best
method for assessing US jurisdiction, but will ultimately lead to a greater proliferation of global
antitrust enforcement. See, e.g., First, supra note 16, at 712ff (asserting that an international
system of antitrust enforcement need not be based on international agreement but rather is
already based on implicit consensus of US antitrust extraterritoriality); Dodge, supra note 2, at
104-06 (arguing that disregarding foreign interests in applying domestic statutes
extraterritorially is the best way promote international cooperation and achieve optimal
regulation).
98. HAWK, supra note 39, at 112 (agreeing that without guidance from the Supreme Court
lower American courts have struggled with the test); Austen Parrish, The Effects Test:
Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1478-81 (highlighting the difficulty
courts have had in uniformly applying the effects test).
99. HAWK, supra note 399, at 112-13 (describing the differing interpretations of Alcoa’s
test arising out of lower courts). See also Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 600, 613-16 (reversing a lower
court decision that required a “direct and substantial effect on United States foreign commerce”);
United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (requiring
“a conspiracy . . . which affects American commerce”); United States v. Timken Roller Bearing
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Moreover, decisions of the courts have varied on the type of effect
required.100
In addition to these criticisms, the application of the Sherman Act
to foreign defendants’ conduct, often legal under the laws of their own
sovereigns, prompted controversy among US trading partners.101 NonUS litigants were concerned with the US government’s power to fine
and imprison non-US defendants as well as the ability of US plaintiffs
to subject non-US companies to expensive discovery and trebledamage exposure.102 As a consequence, US trading partners enacted
legislation blocking discovery and permitting defendants to “claw
back” the treble-damages portion of any private recovery that might be
awarded by a US court.103

Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1949) (articulating the test as “a direct and influencing
effect on trade”).
100. HAWK, supra note 399, at 114-15 (commenting on lower court decisions formulating
Alcoa’s effect requirement); Joseph E. Fortenberry, Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Antitrust
Violations: Paths Through the Great Grimpen Mire, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 519 (1971)
(describing the confusion in the development of the effects doctrine).
101. See WALLER, AMERICAN BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 6-22 n.2 (citing reports
documenting friendly foreign governments’ reactions to Alcoa and its progeny); JOELSON, supra
note 52, at 64-65 (summarizing foreign reactions to US exercise of the effects doctrine);
Popofsky, supra note 15, at 2422-23 (same); First, supra note 16, at 723-24 (same). See also
Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627 (2001)
(noting that disputes with trading parties over the Sherman Acts cross-border reach began just
after Alcoa).
102. First, supra note 16, at 723-24 (explicating non-US defendant’s concerns associated
with the controversy over the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act).
103. Id. at 724 (discussing the reaction of foreign sovereigns to private antitrust litigation
in the United States subjecting non-US nationals to extensive discovery and the potential for
treble liability); see, e.g., Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 920 (explaining that the British Protection
of Trading Interests Act, when invoked, authorizes the English Secretary of State to prevent UK
courts from complying with requests for document production issued by foreign tribunals and
forbids enforcement of treble damage awards or antitrust judgments specified by the Secretary
of State). See also supra note 15. Trading partners that enacted blocking statutes included
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and France. First, supra note 16, at 724 (listing
countries enacting blocking statutes); Sidney Rosdeitcher, Foreign Blocking Statutes and U.S.
Discovery: A Conflict of National Policies, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1061, 1064-66 (1984)
(recounting foreign sovereigns’ legislative reactions to nationals being subjected to US antitrust
litigation).
In general, blocking statutes involved prohibiting disclosure of information located within
the political borders of the enacting sovereign or possessed by that sovereign’s subjects. For a
more detailed account of blocking statutes, see Alexander Layton & Angharad M. Parry,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction – European Responses, 26 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 309, 311-13 (2004)
(explicating the U.K.’s blocking statute, the Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980); R.
Edward Price, Foreign Blocking Statutes and the GATT: State Sovereignty and the Enforcement
of U.S. Economic Laws Abroad, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 315, 322-31 (1995)
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Other calls for restraint have also emerged. In its amicus brief for
Empagran, the DOJ maintained that US antitrust extraterritoriality as
it pertains to private litigation, and with it the treble damage feature,
may deter leniency applicants that greatly aid cartel prosecution.104
Consequently, the agency argues, cartel crackdown efforts would
suffer because the threat to cartels from leniency-applicant turncoats
deters more cartels than would higher penalties.105 Others have
cautioned against negative consequences of overregulation, which in
turn may harm efficiency and consumers as much as the
anticompetitive behavior antitrust laws proscribe.106 The growth of
effects jurisdiction has expanded the number of different jurisdictions
in which regulatory claims must be satisfied.107 This proliferation
increases the cost of doing business internationally: firms must spend
more time and money crafting and maintaining antitrust compliance
programs, defending in lawsuits alleging illegal anticompetitive

(detailing the history, varieties, and consequences of blocking statutes); see generally
Rosdeitcher, supra note 103 (explaining the purpose and function of blocking statutes).
104. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19-21, F.
Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724) [hereinafter DOJ
Brief]. The EC also recognizes the dangers expanded private recovery poses to public cartel
enforcement. See Almunia, supra note 76, at 5 (explaining that the EC Directive presents “the
opportunity to fine-tune the interaction between the actions for damages brought by victims and
the public enforcement by the Commission and [national competition authorities].”).
105. DOJ Brief, supra note 104, at 20-21 (arguing that, because potential amnesty
applicants weigh civil liability exposure when deciding whether to apply to the amnesty
program, “civil liability to all global victims would provide a significant disincentive to seek
amnesty from the government.”).
106. See Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 7 n.13 & at 16 (discussing the detriment
associated with increased regulation of a given transaction or conduct); Layton & Parry, supra
note 103, at 313 (explaining that the U.K. saw undue extraterritorial application of the US
antitrust law as “exposing international businesses to double jeopardy.”). See generally
Terzaken, supra note 70 (arguing that without harmonization and restraint of extraterritoriality
the growth of antitrust jurisdictions produces disproportionate and multiple penalties for the
same violation where overlapping jurisdiction exists).
107. See Wood, supra note 1, at 301-02 (noting that the triumph of the effects doctrine has
complicated the ability of businesses to determine with certainty what conduct was lawful or
unlawful, subjecting these businesses to increased regulation); see also infra note 216 and
accompanying text. See also Terzaken, supra note 70:
Companies caught in the crosshairs of serial enforcement agencies complain that
whatever the alleged transgressions, the sanctions they and other defendants now face
are badly out of whack. The problem isn’t just prosecutorial overkill, but outright
piling on. One illustration is the recent Air Cargo cartel case. As part of what was
alleged to be an overarching conspiracy to artificially inflate surcharges on global air
freight services, antitrust prosecutors in at least ten different jurisdictions brought
enforcement actions.
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conduct, and completing cross-border transactions subject to merger
reviews.108
Lastly, worldwide governments have expressed concern that US
antitrust extraterritoriality stunts the growth of their own antitrust
regimes due to the allure of treble damages.109 For example,
competition authorities have argued that improper extraterritorial
application of US antitrust law is likely to substantially undermine the
effectiveness of other countries’ leniency programs, which are
successful tools in discovering unlawful cartel activity, and thus will
interfere with those countries’ overall antitrust enforcement, including
private enforcement.110 Additionally, broad availability of US treble
damage recovery to non-US litigants attracts away cases that might
otherwise be litigated in non-US courts, thereby depriving those
jurisdictions the development of the substantial body of jurisprudence
108. Wood, supra note 1, at 302-03 (describing the administrative burdens associated with
overlapping merger jurisdictions); Terzaken, supra note 70 (exemplifying the increase in
defending in multiple lawsuits through the Air Cargo cartel case, in which defendants faced
actions in the United States, European Union, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand,
South Africa, South Korea, and Switzerland). In addition to these accounting costs, the growth
of the effects doctrine may also increase the economic costs associated with chilling beneficial
conduct. See. e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J. L. & ECON. 445,
447 (1985) (explaining that excessive enforcement of antitrust laws has the potential to produce
socially undesirable costs by “inducing firms to back off, to avoid approaching the margin at
which the costs of more competition and more cooperation are in equilibrium.”).
109. See Diamond, supra note 12, at 810, 823-24 (touching on the argument that claims
being pursued under the Sherman Act stunt the growth of private recovery); Margaret Bloom,
Should Foreign Purchasers Have Access to U.S. Antitrust Damages Remedies? A PostEmpagran Perspective from Europe, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 433, 451 (2005) (stating the
EC’s belief that cartel deterrence by the United States alone was an insufficient deterrent and
that if “foreign purchasers have ready access to U.S. antitrust damages remedies, this will attract
away cases from EU courts that might otherwise by litigated in Europe.”). See also Empagran,
542 U.S. at 167-68 (listing complaints lodged by non-US governments in amicus curiae briefs
highlighting the trouble of treble damages in drawing non-US plaintiffs to US courts and
interfering with their domestic enforcement policies); Layton & Parry, supra note 103, at 31013 (examining the U.K.’s responses to Sherman Act extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction,
which including a recognition that “[t]here was an obvious danger that business would seek
enforcement of antitrust laws for less than public-spirited motives” in the United States by virtue
of treble damage availability).
110. KFTC Motorola Brief, supra note 3, at 4 (“Such disincentive [to seek leniency with
non-U.S. competition authorities due to potential increased exposure to U.S. antitrust liability
under broader extraterritorial application] is likely to undermine substantially the effectiveness
of other countries’ leniency programs and will interfere with the countries’ overall antitrust
enforcement.”); Bloom, supra note 109, at 451 (explaining the EC’s argument that interfering
with a competition authority’s leniency program directly harms private enforcement because
“[u]nless cartels are uncovered by the competition authorities – most frequently through a
leniency application – there cannot be a [private] lawsuit.”). The Korean Fair Trade Commission
is the competition authority of South Korea.

2017]

INTERNATIONAL COMITY BALANCING TEST

255

that is necessary to facilitate the private enforcement of antitrust
claims.111 An example of underdeveloped jurisprudence can be
demonstrated in Israel, where the Israeli Supreme Court has not yet
been required to decide whether Israel’s antitrust statute provides for
indirect purchaser recovery.112 Other countries with underdeveloped
private recovery doctrine, such as South Africa and Denmark, have
seen little private litigation to fine-tune their private enforcement
schemes, though activity is on the rise.113
A. Non-Judicial Checks on Extraterritoriality
In response to this international criticism, the United States has
taken steps to clarify and define conduct that is subject to US
jurisdiction. These efforts have taken the form of legislation (the
FTAIA) and bilateral agreements with important trading partners
111. Diamond, supra note 12, at 824 (“Courts need a steady-diet of cases to feed the
development of a body of jurisprudence that will in turn facilitate private enforcement of
antitrust claims; if those cases are attracted to the United States, foreign antitrust development
will suffer.”); Bloom, supra note 109, at 451 (pointing out that if recovery under US antitrust
law is made broadly available to non-US purchasers that it strips valuable private litigation from
jurisdictions with developing antitrust law).
112. See Restrictive Trade Practices Law, 5748-1988 (Israel’s antitrust law); Tadmor &
Bakal, supra note 82, at 76 (detailing private actions under Israel’s antitrust statute).
113. See Mark Garden & Lufuno Shinwana, South Africa, in GETTING THE DEAL
THROUGH: PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 2017 113-14 (Samantha Mobley ed., 2016)
(explaining that there is an absence of private litigation for damages in part because private
recovery hinges upon whether South Africa’s competition authority can prove liability but that
an uptick has been seen marked by South Africa’s first class action antitrust suit in 2010); Henrik
Peytz, Thomas Mygind & Mia Anne Gantzhorn, Denmark, in GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH:
PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 2017 33 (Samantha Mobley ed., 2016) (“[P]rivate antitrust
litigation is in its infancy in Denmark, but it is growing and a rise in the number of cases can be
expected as the principles to be applied in such litigation, regarding both the procedural issues
as well as the conditions for liability, are clear” due largely to the EC Directive); Malcom Ratz,
Flying Into New Heights: Damages Claims Arising from Contraventions of the Competition Act,
DE REBUS (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.derebus.org.za/flying-new-heights-damages-claimsarising-contraventions-competition-act/ [https://perma.cc/GCF2-UP5X] (archived Oct. 26,
2017) (announcing that a South African High Court gave the first ever judgment relating to the
damages stage of private litigation that “will undoubtedly herald in a new phase of competition
law in South Africa”); see also supra note 19. But see Lizl Leonardo, Comment, A Proposal to
the Seventh and Ninth Circuit Split: Expand the Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws to
Extraterritorial Conduct that Impacts U.S. Commerce, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 175, 208-09 (2016)
(arguing for broader extraterritorial application in part because private recovery is only available
in a limited number of non-US jurisdictions, and where it exists it is sparse due to low probability
of success stemming from stringent requirements of proving actual damages and requiring
plaintiffs to pay all court courts). For a response to these criticisms, see supra § II.B (explaining
that a growing number of countries recognize the value of private enforcement and are enacting
laws that provide more plaintiff-friendly discourse).
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containing comity provisions. These agreements are examples of
positive comity: preemptive steps taken by the United States and
trading partners to establish enforcement protocol.114
1. The FTAIA
The FTAIA was drafted for the purpose of clarifying US antitrust
statutes “to make explicit their application only to conduct having a
‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ on domestic
commerce or domestic exports.”115 Hoping to address the concerns
expressed over the unrestrained effects doctrine, Congress sought to
create a single, objective test to serve as “a simple and straightforward
clarification of existing American law” and US antitrust regulator
standards.116 The statute thus endorsed the effects doctrine by requiring
that the effects of the anticompetitive conduct on US commerce “give
rise to a claim” under US antitrust laws.117
As the Supreme Court stressed in Empagran, the FTAIA also
reflects principles of international comity by limiting the types of
foreign conduct to which US antitrust law applies in order to avoid
unreasonable interference with the commercial activity of other
countries.118 The statute constitutes the first time since 1890 that the
jurisdictional language of the Sherman Act distinguishes between
imports and exports, removing export and purely foreign transactions
from US courts while carving-out import transactions.119 Notably,
though, while the FTAIA was meant to limit antitrust liability for US
sellers transacting abroad with foreign buyers, one consideration in the

114. See infra § III.A.2.
115. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 2 (1982).
116. Id.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2); H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 5 (1982) (“Since Judge Learned Hand’s
opinion in [Alcoa], it has been relatively clear that it is the situs of the effects as opposed to the
conduct, that determines whether United States antitrust law applies.”).
118. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164-65 (explaining that the FTAIA was intended to prevent
“unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations” because untamed
extraterritorial application of US law “creates a serious risk of interference with a foreign
nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial affairs.”); Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d
at 854 (“As the Supreme Court stressed in Empagran, the public recognition of [the FTAIA’s
international limitation of U.S. antitrust law] was inspired largely by international comity.”).
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (exempting export transactions from the Sherman Act where the
effect of the illegal anticompetitive activity occurs abroad); see also HAWK, supra note 39, at
173 (adding that though the FTAIA differentiates jurisdiction over import and export
transactions it is largely consistent with prior US case law).
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statute’s formulation was to maintain the protection of US laws for
foreign purchasers transacting within the United States.120
2. Positive Comity
In addition to legislation, the United States and other countries
have also entered into bilateral agreements with positive comity
provisions, whereby the United States’ competition authorities, the
DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission, and those of other countries
typically agree to, among other things, certain measures recognized as
necessary to avoid potential enforcement conflicts.121 Comity is a
concept of reciprocal deference, described as serving “our international
system like the mortar which cements together a brick house.”122 By
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(B) (applying US antitrust law to export opportunities of a
person engaging in exporting from the United States); 1981 FTAIA Hearings, supra note 57, at
114 (“Obviously, we will always have situations where foreign firms are in the United States
doing business in the United States, for example, purchasing in the United States, and will have
the protection of our laws, whereas to the extent they do business within their own domicile they
would not have the protection of those laws.”); Kruman, 284 F.3d at 403 n.10 (“Indeed, to deny
[foreign purchasers] this protection [of U.S. antitrust law in American markets] could violate
this Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties this country has entered into with a number
of foreign nations.”); supra notes 56 & 57 and accompanying text. But see WALLER, AMERICAN
BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 9-11 (concluding that the majority of cases where plaintiffs seek to
assert jurisdiction under the FTAIA held that the statute bars US jurisdiction even for domestic
conduct where the only effects are felt in other markets); cf. id. at 9-14 (noting that “the FTAIA
is unlikely to protect defendants accused of restraining competition in export markets as part of
a broader conspiracy in the United States or world markets.”).
121. See, e.g., Agreement on Antitrust Cooperation Between the United States Department
of Justice and the United States Federal Trade Commission, of the One Part, and the National
Institute for the Defense of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property (INDECOPI)
of the Republic of Peru, of the Other Part, May 26, 2016, U.S.-Peru,
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/cooperation-agreements/us-peru-antitrust-cooperation-agreement
[https://perma.cc/4EX7-YNY9] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) [hereinafter U.S.-Peru Bilateral
Agreement] (the United States’ latest bilateral antitrust agreement which provides that “[t]he
U.S. antitrust agencies and INDECOPI shall, within the framework of their laws, and to the
extent compatible with their important interests, give careful consideration to the important
interests of the other country’s competition authority throughout all phases of their enforcement
activities”); Cooper, supra note 6, at 388ff (recounting the events that led up to and formed the
basis for the U.S-Japan bilateral antitrust cooperation agreement).
122. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937. See also Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 6
(“Comity is a horizontal, nation-to-nation concept, seeking – by reciprocal deference – to
maximize the joint interests of the affected nations or to split their differences through repeated
interactions.”); Snell, supra note 16, at 229 n.83 (“The traditional concept of international
comity is a negative one: A nation refrains from extending its own legal or administrative
activities into the areas of competence of another nation state.”). The Supreme Court of Canada
has adopted a similar legal definition of international comity. See Morguard Invs., Ltd. v. Be
Savoye, 1990 S.C.R. 1077, 1096 (Can.) (“[Comity] is a recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
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definition, international comity is a doctrine that counsels voluntary
forbearance when a sovereign that has a legitimate claim to jurisdiction
concludes that a second sovereign has a greater claim to jurisdiction
under principles of international law.123 However, international comity
never obligates a national forum to ignore the rights of its own citizens
or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.124
Positive comity, on the other hand, entails “one nation helping the
other, with respect to international rules of peaceful cooperation and
assistance.”125 Use of positive comity in US bilateral trade agreements
has typically addressed cooperation between competition authorities
and attempts to avoid jurisdictional and sovereignty tensions “by
placing initial responsibility for investigation of market access barriers
into the hands of the jurisdiction where the alleged anticompetitive
behavior occurs.”126 In other words, it acts as a “mechanism whereby
the jurisdiction more closely associated with the alleged
anticompetitive conduct assumes primary responsibility for the
investigation and possible remedy,” precluding the need for
extraterritorial enforcement.127 These bilateral agreements reflect the
United States’ objective of increasing coordination to avoid
enforcement system clashes and international disputes, which have
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the right of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws.”).
123. Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 8 (defining international comity). See also Eleanor Fox,
Extraterritoriality, Antitrust, and the New Restatement: Is “Reasonableness” the Answer?, 19
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 565, 567 n.4 (1987) (explaining that some see the concept of comity
as fully discretionary while others see it as an element of obligation); supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
124. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164 (comity contemplates due regard to the national forum’s own
citizens and other persons under protection of its laws); Morguard Invs., 1990 S.C.R. at 1096
(same).
125. Snell, supra note 16, at 229 n.83 (defining positive comity in comparison to the
traditional sense of international comity); see, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Commission of the European Communities Regarding the
Application of Their Competition Laws, U.S.-EC, art. I., Sept. 23, 1991,
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/0525.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
F5ZQ-MUTR] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (“The purpose of this Agreement is to promote
cooperation and coordination and lessen the possibility or impact of differences between the
Parties in the application of their competition laws.”).
126. ICPAC Report, supra note 6, at 226-27. See, e.g., U.S.-Peru Bilateral Agreement,
supra note 121, at Art. 1(1) (“The purpose of this Agreement is to promote cooperation,
including cooperation in the enforcement of competition laws, and to ensure that the U.S.
antitrust agencies and INDECOPI give careful consideration to each other’s important interests
in the application of their competition laws.”).
127. ICPAC Report, supra note 6, at 226.
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tended to hurt US business interests.128 The United States currently has
cooperative agreements, memorandum of understandings, or enhanced
comity agreements with fifteen jurisdictions, including the EC.129 But,
these bilateral agreements do not override inconsistent provisions of
US law because they are not treaties ratified by the United States
Senate.130 To date, however, positive comity provisions do not address
jurisdictional concerns for private litigation.
B. Judicial Response to Sherman Act Extraterritoriality
In addition to legislation and positive comity, US courts have also
considered international comity in determining whether or not the
United States has jurisdiction over certain conduct repugnant to US
antitrust law. Three cases in particular have articulated international
comity principles: Timberlane, Hartford Fire, and Empagran.
However, it would not be until the Supreme Court’s decision in
Empagran that international comity would function as a limitation on
extraterritorial jurisdiction for antitrust lawsuits in all US courts.131
1. Timberlane
Timberlane is the first decision to have recognized the comity
doctrine as a potential defense or limiting factor in cases brought under
the Sherman Act.132 International comity as a doctrine of limitation was

128. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 6, at 388ff (discussing the events and circumstances
leading the 1999 agreement between Japan and the United States).
129. See International Competition and Consumer Protection Agreements, FED. TRADE
COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/international/international-cooperation-agreements
[https://perma.cc/7L3U-9XNA] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017). Jurisdictions include Australia
(1982), Brazil (1999), Canada (1995, enhanced comity in 2004), Chile (2011), China (2011),
Colombia (2014), EC (1991, enhanced comity in 1998), Germany (1976), India (2012), Israel
(1999), Japan (1999), Mexico (2000), Russia (2009), South Korea (2015), and Peru (2016).
130. ICPAC Report, supra note 6, at Annex 1-Cv.
131. See, e.g., Waller, Twilight, supra note 64, at 564 (2000) (“Since [1976], comity has
remained the darling of the majority of academic commentators, but has received an ambivalent
reception in the courts and uniform rejection from American legislators.”). Recent lower court
approaches to comity analysis have largely followed the precedents set in Hartford Fire and
Empagran. See, e.g., In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 185-86 (2d Cir. 2016)
(relying on Hartford Fire in conducting a comity analysis of whether US and Chinese laws
presented a “true conflict”); Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 834 (relying in part on Empagran’s
invocation of international comity to bar recovery by a US parent company for antitrust injuries
dealt to its foreign non-wholly owned subsidiaries).
132. See BREYER, supra note 7, at 99 (explaining that with Timberlane the Ninth Circuit
for the first time undertook an interest-balancing analysis to determine the proprietary of
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first proposed as the “jurisdictional rule of reason” by Kingman
Brewster in 1958 and reached its zenith in 1976 when the Ninth Circuit
in Timberlane declared that a comity analysis was required before
exercising jurisdiction to prescribe under the Sherman Act.133 In that
case, a US plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a US bank, conspired
with officials in Honduras to prevent Timberlane’s subsidiaries in
Honduras from milling lumber and exporting it to the United States.134
Importantly, the alleged anticompetitive activity took place entirely
outside of the United States, was perpetrated mainly by foreign
citizens, and the effect was primarily felt in Honduras.135
The court held that an effect on US commerce was necessary but
not sufficient to assert US jurisdiction.136 Rather, courts should assess
whether the “interests of, and links to, the United States – including the
magnitude of the effect on American foreign commerce – are
sufficiently strong, vis-à-vis those of other nations, to justify an
assertion of extraterritorial authority.”137 To do so, the court put forth a
balancing test to account for (1) potential conflicts of law or policy, (2)
identity of the parties, (3) expectation of antitrust enforcement, (4)
comparative effect of the alleged conduct between the United States
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act); Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 7
(“Timberlane [is] the parent of U.S. antitrust comity ‘doctrine.’”).
133. Popofsky, supra note 15, at 2423-24; Waller, Twilight, supra note 64, at 564. See
also KINGMAN BREWSTER, JR., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958).
The Second, Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits would later follow Timberlane’s lead. See In re
Vitamin C Litig., 837 F.3d at 184-86 (employing the Timberlane factors to determine whether
or not to abstain from asserting jurisdiction on comity grounds); Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Matsui
& Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that defendants failed to satisfy the Timberlane test
in support of summary judgment motion); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864
(10th Cir. 1981) (employing Timberlane analysis to find that United States courts had no
jurisdiction over a suit in which a foreign plaintiff alleged Sherman Act violations committed
by US companies’ foreign subsidiaries); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d
1287 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that where foreign nations were involved, foreign policy,
reciprocity, comity, and limitations of judicial power were considerations have bearing on the
court’s decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction). Not all circuits followed, however. See
Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 948-49 (observing that the Timberlane factors “are not useful in
resolving the controversy” involving defendants initiating suit in British court to bar US court
from adjudicating antitrust claims brought by a British plaintiff); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig.,
617 F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding that failing to consider Timberlane test did not
amount to an abuse of discretion).
134. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 601.
135. Id. (summarizing the plaintiffs’ allegations); Diamond, supra note 12, at 813
(distinguishing Timberlane from American Banana and Alcoa).
136. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 611-12, 613 (proclaiming the effects doctrine incomplete
because it does not account for foreign sovereigns’ interests).
137. Id. at 613.
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and the foreign country, (5) degree of harm to US commerce, (6) the
foreseeability of the effect, and (7) the importance of the violations
alleged in the United States compared with those in the foreign
country.138
2. Hartford Fire
In contrast to the attention the Ninth Circuit paid evaluating a
foreign sovereign’s interests in regulating alleged anticompetitive
conduct in Timberlane, the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire articulated
a new principle of prescriptive jurisdiction by which international
comity considerations are relevant only when a “true conflict between
domestic and foreign law” exists.139 The Hartford Fire Court defined a
“true conflict” of law as when a party subject to regulation by two states
cannot simultaneously comply with the laws of both, lest the laws of
one be infringed.140 Notably, the Court gave little contemplation to the
FTAIA, explaining only that in enacting the statute “Congress
expressed no view on the question whether a court with Sherman Act
jurisdiction should ever decline to exercise such jurisdiction on
grounds of international comity” but declining to answer that
question.141
3. Empagran
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hartford Fire set the stage for a change
of course on which the Court embarked in Empagran.142 In that
138. See id. at 614. The court concluded after listing the balancing test’s elements that “[a]
court evaluating these factors should identify the potential degree of conflict if American
authority is asserted.” Id.
139. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798-99; David J. Gerber, Prescriptive Authority:
Global Markets as a Challenge to National Regulatory Systems, 26 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 287,
296 (2004). Cf. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 854 (explaining that Hartford Fire suggested a
pragmatic reason for the FTAIA’s inapplicability to import transactions, namely that
“[f]oreigners who want to earn money from the sale of goods or services in American markets
should expect to have to comply with U.S. law”).
140. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799.
141. Id. at 798. Recently, though, lower courts have employed such comity analyses. In In
re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a price-fixing claim
brought against Chinese manufacturers of Vitamin C chiefly due to the existence of a “true
conflict” between Chinese and United States law. See 837 F.3d at 185-86 (finding that while the
existence of a “true conflict” may not be a necessary prerequisite for invoking the doctrine of
comity, the existence of one is sufficient to abstain from asserting jurisdiction).
142. See Fox, Remedies, supra note 14, at 578 (noting that in Empagran the Supreme
Court substantially adopted Justice Scalia’s Hartford Fire dissent); Diamond, supra note 12, at
815 (citing Harry First, Prof., NYU School of Law, Remarks at the N.Y. State Bar Ass’n 2005
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dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia reframes the question before the
Court as not whether the United States has the prescriptive jurisdiction
to subject the British defendants to US antitrust law, but rather whether
it has exercised that jurisdiction in enacting the Sherman Act.143 In
doing so, Justice Scalia invokes a canon of statutory construction
predicated on prescriptive comity to argue that Congress did not intend
for the Sherman Act to unequivocally apply to extraterritorial conduct
without considering the jurisdictional claims of foreign states.144 This
reflected the Court’s new approach to comity, one which was
concerned not with the direct conflicts highlighted in Hartford Fire but
instead focused on harmonization of similar national laws that seek to
achieve common objectives.145
In Empagran, which was a follow-on action to the Vitamins
Case146 cartel prosecution of the late 1990s, foreign and US class
plaintiffs asserted a Sherman Act claim against a mix of foreign and
US defendants.147 After the US class settled, the Empagran Court faced
an issue of interpreting the FTAIA to decide whether the statute’s
condition that a requisite domestic effect “give[] rise to a claim” refers
broadly to any potential claim or specifically to the plaintiff’s claim.148
Antitrust Law Section Symposium: Empagran and the International Reach of U.S. Antitrust
Laws (Jan. 27, 2005)).
143. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144. See id. at 814-21; JOELSON, supra note 52, at 53 (“The Court reasoned that Congress,
mindful of principles of customary international law implicating the legitimate sovereign
interests of other nations, sought to release from U.S. antitrust constructs anticompetitive
conduct causing foreign effects unrelated to domestic effects.”).
145. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164-65 (observing that the contemporary global economy
demands harmonization of potentially conflicting laws of different nations); BREYER, supra note
7, at 92 (“‘Comity’ once referred simply to the need to ensure that domestic and foreign laws
did not impose contradictory duties upon the same individual . . . Today it means something
more. In applying it, our Court has increasingly sought interpretations of domestic law that
would allow it to work in harmony with foreign laws, so that together they can more effectively
achieve common objectives.”).
146. The Vitamins Case was a prosecution of an international price-fixing conspiracy
among vitamin manufacturers that began in the late 1990s and involved defendants from the
United States, Switzerland, and Germany. Diamond, supra note 12, at 806 (describing briefly
the cartel prosecution leading to Empagran); First, supra note 16, at 712ff (narrating in detail
the events of the Vitamins Case cartel prosecution). The vitamins at issue were “most commonly
used as nutritional supplements or to enrich animal feed; they [were] also used in vitamin
premixes to enrich numerous processed foods (such as breakfast cereals).” First, supra note 16,
at 715.
147. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 159-61 (detailing the procedural posture of the case);
Diamond, supra note 12, at 806 (summarizing the procedural history leading up to the Empagran
decision).
148. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 159.
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Following similar logic to Justice Scalia’s Hartford Fire dissent, the
Supreme Court invoked prescriptive comity to conclude that Congress
did not intend to expand the Sherman Act’s scope in anyway by
enacting the FTAIA, and thus foreign injury resulting from foreign
conduct independent of a domestic effect did not qualify for the
statute’s carve-out.149 In effect, Empagran dictated that the FTAIA has
two distinct causation inquiries, one asking whether a defendant’s
foreign conduct causes a cognizable domestic effect, and the other
asking whether that effect causes the plaintiff’s injury.150 This is the
current governing US case law on the FTAIA.
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE
Although clarity was one of Congress’ goals in enacting the
FTAIA, the statute as drafted is anything but clear, and the FTAIA
itself has contributed to the ill-defined boundaries of the effects
doctrine. The FTAIA has produced a number of circuit splits, one of
which was decided by Empagran.151 Other circuit splits currently exist,
including one between the Seventh and Ninth circuits concerning the
interpretation of the FTAIA’s requirement that anticompetitive
behavior have a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect”
on US commerce which the Supreme Court has so far abstained from
resolving.152 As explained in Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., the
“substantial” and “reasonably foreseeable” prongs have produced little
dispute and are relatively straightforward.153 Rather, what it takes to
show “direct” is less clear.154 The Seventh Circuit took the position
that, like in tort law, recovery should be cut off for injuries that are too
remote from the cause of an injury and held that the term “direct”
means only “a reasonably proximate causal nexus.”155
To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. LSL
Biotechnologies looked to the Supreme Court’s definition of “direct”

149. See id. at 163-69.
150. See Lotes, 753 F.3d at 414.
151. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 160-61; see also Amelie Doublet, Motorola Mobility II and
the Circuit Split Over the Interpretation of the FTAIA: The Necessity of Supreme Court Review,
83 USLW Issue No. 43 2015-05, Bloomberg BNA.
152. See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015); Doublet,
supra note 151.
153. 683 F.3d 845, 856 (7th Cir. 2012).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 856-57.
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from a different statute germane to international relations.156 Drawing
from dictionary definitions and language in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act that is similar to that in the FTAIA, the court held that
an effect is “direct” if “it follows the immediate consequence of the
defendant’s activity.”157 This definition was subsequently utilized by
the Ninth Circuit in its decision in United States v. Hsiung (the criminal
prosecution of the defendants in Motorola Mobility), which expressly
rejected Minn-Chem’s “reasonably proximate causal nexus” approach
and reiterated instead the broader “immediate consequence” test.158
A. Problems Arising from the Circuit Split
Using Minn-Chem’s definition of “direct,” however, has produced
a questionable holding in Motorola Mobility.159 In that case, a US
company, Motorola, brought a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, alleging that it was the victim of price-fixing among foreign
manufacturers of liquid crystal display (“LCD”) panels used as
components in the manufacture of cellphones.160 The LCD panel
manufacturers had already been found guilty of participating in an
illegal cartel, and those convictions were affirmed in Hsiung.161
Motorola was a major purchaser of LCD panels, but had purchased
most of the price-fixed products through its majority-owned foreign
subsidiaries.162 Only one percent of its purchases were made directly
by Motorola in the United States and incorporated into cellphones also
sold in the United States.163 The other ninety-nine percent of its
purchases were made abroad.164 Of those purchases, forty-two percent

156. 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,
504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992) (interpreting the “direct effect” in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605, to be an effect that “follows ‘as an immediate consequence of the
defendant’s . . . activity.’”).
157. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d at 680 (drawing similarities between the exception in the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the FTAIA).
158. 778 F.3d 738, 758 (9th Cir. 2015). See also id. at 759 n.9 (recognizing the
disagreement with the Seventh Circuit).
159. See generally Ellen Meriwether, Motorola Mobility and the FTAIA: If Not Here, Then
Where?, 29 ANTITRUST 8 (2015) (critiquing the outcome of Motorola Mobility). See also
Leonardo, supra note 113, at 206ff (same).
160. Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 817.
161. Id.; see also Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2015).
162. Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 817, 818.
163. Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 817.
164. Id.
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were incorporated into phones destined for the United States, while the
remainder were used to make phones sold abroad.165
In its first stab at the appeal of the lower court’s decision, the
Seventh Circuit following Minn-Chem’s definition of “direct” held that
anticompetitive behavior affecting intermediary products, rather than
final products, could not have a “direct” effect on US commerce.166
After additional consideration likely influenced by the DOJ’s concern
with the initial holding and its implications for international cartel
enforcement, the court vacated the first opinion and opted for a
different approach to the same conclusion.167 Summarizing that the
case involved “components [that] were sold by their manufacturers to
their foreign subsidiaries, which incorporated them into the finished
product to Motorola for resale in the United States,” Judge Posner
branded the wrongful conduct, effect, and injury as entirely
extraterritorial because Motorola and its subsidiaries did not function
as one enterprise.168 Therefore, the court construed Motorola as an
indirect purchaser, barred from bringing a claim under the Sherman Act
by virtue of the holding in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,169 and
concluded that the entire transaction falls outside of the FTAIA’s
exception, though recognizing that the effect on US commerce may,
perhaps, be “direct.”170
But, the court’s reliance on Illinois Brick was no better than its
initial attempt to characterize the effect of the LCD cartel on US
commerce. Several points suggest Motorola Mobility was wrongly
decided, including inconsistencies with US precedent and statutes. In
holding that Motorola and its subsidiaries did not function as one
enterprise because they are governed by the different laws of the
countries in which they are incorporated and operated, Judge Posner
165. Id.
166. See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 746 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2014).
167. See Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 817. The DOJ’s amicus brief urged the court to
vacate its March 27, 2014 opinion, arguing that the court’s holding - that component price-fixing
does not directly affect US commerce in component-incorporating products - severely hampered
the agency’s ability to prosecute international cartels. See Brief for the United States and the
Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 1, 17-18, Motorola
Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-8003).
168. See id. at 819 (“The conduct increased the cost to Motorola of the cellphones that it
bought from its foreign subsidiaries, but the cartel-engendered price increase in the components
and in the price of the cellphones that incorporated them occurred entirely in foreign
commerce.”).
169. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
170. See Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 819-823.
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disregarded the Supreme Court’s central holding in Copperweld Corp.
v. Independence Tube Corp.171 Copperweld’s progeny have found a
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiaries to be a “single entity”
with “complete unity of interest” and, similarly, have also found a lack
of relevant differences between a corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiary for Sherman Act analysis.172 Additionally, for non-wholly
owned subsidiaries, courts relying on Copperweld have treated a parent
and its non-wholly owned subsidiary as a single entity for antitrust
purposes where the parent held a controlling majority of the
subsidiary’s stock.173
In addition to precedent, other US antitrust statutes treat parents
and subsidiaries as one entity. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvement Act (“HSR”) requires a business acquiring another
business in a transaction meeting certain thresholds to file a premerger
notification with the government.174 If the acquiring business is
controlled by a parent corporation, the HSR mandates that the “ultimate
parent entity” file the notification regardless of the nationality of the
acquired business.175 Furthermore, appearing to be influenced by

171. 467 U.S. 752 (1984). In Copperweld, the Court held that because subsidiaries and
their parent corporations are not independent entities, they are incapable of conspiring with one
another within the meaning of the Sherman Act. Id. at 777. The Court reasoned that “in reality
a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary always have a ‘unity of purpose or common design’ . .
. whether or not the parent keeps a tight rein over the subsidiary.” Id. at 771.
172. See Century Oil Tool, Inc. v. Production Specialties, Inc., 737 F.2d 1316, 1317 (5th
Cir. 1984) (observing the lack of any relevant differences between a corporation and its wholly
owned subsidiary, and two corporations wholly owned by a third corporation); Newport
Components v. NEC Home Elec., Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1544 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that
manufacturer and two wholly owned subsidiaries must be viewed as a “single entity” with
“complete unity of interest” for purposes of the Sherman Act).
173. See Direct Media Corp. v. Camden Tel. & Tel. Co., 989 F. Supp. 1211, 1217 (S.D.
Ga. 1997) (parent owned fifty-one percent); Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs. v. Hitachi Data Sys. Corp.,
849 F. Supp. 702, 706 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (eighty percent); Novatel Comm’cns, Inc. v. Cellular
Tel. Supply, Inc., No. C85-2674A, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16017, at *25-26 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23,
1986) (fifty-one percent). See also Wesley Health Sys., LLC v. Forrest County Bd. of
Supervisors, No. 2:12-CV-59-KS-MTP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7764, at *23-29 (S.D. Miss. Jan.
22, 2014) (two-thirds control of the board); Coast Cities Truck Sales v. Navistar Int’l Transp.
Co., 912 F. Supp. 747, 765 (D.N.J. 1995) (seventy percent of the voting shares). But see In re
Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litig., No. 2:09-md-02042, 216 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146013,
at *25-28 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2016) (relying on Motorola Mobility to hold that a US parent
corporation may not treat its minority-owned foreign manufacturing subsidiary as an extension
of itself for satisfying the FTAIA or avoiding the indirect purchaser-standing rule).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (setting out the criteria triggering premerger filing under HSR).
175. 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(a)(1) (clarifying that the entity responsible for HSR filing,
“person,” means the “ultimate parent company”).
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Copperweld, the HSR does not require filing for the merger of two
wholly owned subsidiaries with a common parent.176
Motorola also argued that it was the “target” of the illegal conduct
or, alternatively, the direct victim because its subsidiary “passed on”
the cartel-inflated portion of the original purchase price to Motorola.177
In Illinois Brick, which also contemplated the offensive use of the illfated pass-on theory in US antitrust jurisprudence, Justice White
surmised that a situation in which the pass-on defense “might be
permitted” is where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its
customer.178 Posner, highlighting the semantic difference between
“might be” and “is,” brushed this off as meaningless.179
176. 16 C.F.R. § 802.30 (exempting intracorporate transactions from HSR filing
requirements); Michael D. Belsley, Comment, The Vatican Merger Defense – Should Two
Catholic Hospitals Seeking to Merge be Considered a Single Entity for Purposes of Antitrust
Merger Analysis?, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 720, 727 n.40 (1996) (describing Copperweld’s influence
on the government’s HSR filing instructions).
Even assuming it is appropriate to view Motorola as a separate and downstream entity from
its subsidiaries for the purposes of its analysis, the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on Illinois Brick is
still misplaced. The Illinois Brick Court reasoned that allowing both direct and indirect
purchasers to bring suit would place a greater evidentiary burden on plaintiffs by necessitating
complex econometric modeling to assess what portion of the inflated price was passed on to the
indirect purchaser and what portion absorbed by the direct purchaser. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at
731-32 (discussing Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968)). So, it
concluded, “antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by concentrating the full recovery
… in the direct purchaser.” Id. at 735. But because Motorola controls its foreign subsidiaries,
there would not be both a direct purchaser suit and an indirect purchaser suit. See Appellant’s
Opening Brief at 9, Motorola Mobility, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 14-8003 (7th Cir. Aug.
29, 2014) (stating that Motorola “functioned with its subsidiaries as a single enterprise”);
Meriwether, supra note 159, at 13 (enumerating the ways in which Motorola controlled all
aspects of its mobile phone business). Indeed, Posner all but concedes this point and instead
distinguishes Motorola from its foreign subsidiaries by pointing out that the foreign subsidiaries
are “incorporated under and regulated by foreign law.” Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 823. The
issue faced in Illinois Brick was therefore categorically different from the issue fabricated by the
Seventh Circuit – injury was, in fact, quite easily assessed for the “indirect purchaser” in
Motorola Mobility in comparison with the Illinois Brick scenario and other classic indirect
purchaser cases.
177. See id. at 822-23 (discussing Motorola’s “target” and “pass-on” theories of standing).
The pass-on theory was an argument originally made by defendant cartelists that the plaintiff
direct purchaser did not suffer antitrust injury because any overpayment made as a result of the
alleged anticompetitive conduct was passed on to the plaintiff’s customers in the form of inflated
downstream prices. See Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 488-93. The issue decided in Illinois Brick
involved offensive use of pass-on as justification for indirect purchaser antitrust standing. Ill.
Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 726.
178. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 736 n.16.
179. Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 823.
Even assuming it is appropriate to view Motorola as a separate entity from its subsidiaries
for the purposes of its analysis, the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on Illinois Brick is still misplaced.
The Illinois Brick Court reasoned that allowing both direct and indirect purchasers to bring suit
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The Motorola Mobility decision has negative consequences for
US antitrust law, non-US subsidiaries of American parents relying on
US law for potential recovery, US businesses operating internationally
with international subsidiaries, and consumers. In essence, the Seventh
Circuit announced a broad rule that eliminates private antitrust
remedies where the first purchase of a price-fixed component occurs
offshore, drastically mitigating the ability of US antitrust law to deter
harmful foreign conduct targeting US markets.180 Is Posner really
suggesting that American businesses are only protected by US antitrust
law when the domestic parent itself engages in such wholly foreign
transactions?181
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit’s decision creates a glaring
inconsonance with the Ninth Circuit’s in what should be similar
outcomes to similar cases. Despite justifying its second decision the
Seventh Circuit by warning that “rampant extraterritorial application of
U.S. law ‘creates a serious risk of interference with a foreign nation’s
ability to independently regulate its own affairs,’” the court did not
delve into any meaningful comity analysis.182 Particularly troubling is
that while concerned with the prospect of “rampant extraterritoriality,”
the court gives no attention to whether Motorola would be able to
recover abroad or, more importantly, whether the cartels’ host
would place a greater evidentiary burden on plaintiffs by necessitating complex econometric
modeling to assess what portion of the inflated price was passed on to the indirect purchaser and
what portion absorbed by the direct purchaser. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 731-32 (discussing
Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968)). So, it concluded, “antitrust
laws will be more effectively enforced by concentrating the full recovery … in the direct
purchaser.” Id. at 735. But because Motorola controls its foreign subsidiaries, there would not
be both a direct purchaser suit and an indirect purchaser suit. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at
9, Motorola Mobility, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 14-8003 (7th Cir. Aug. 29, 2014) (stating
that Motorola “functioned with its subsidiaries as a single enterprise”); Meriwether, supra note
159, at 13 (enumerating the ways in which Motorola controlled all aspects of its mobile phone
business). Indeed, Posner all but concedes this point and instead distinguishes Motorola from its
foreign subsidiaries by pointing out that the foreign subsidiaries are “incorporated under and
regulated by foreign law.” Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 823. The issue faced in Illinois Brick
was therefore categorically different from the issue fabricated by the Seventh Circuit – injury
was, in fact, quite easily assessed for the “indirect purchaser” in Motorola Mobility in
comparison with the Illinois Brick scenario and other classic indirect purchaser cases.
180. See Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 823.
181. See, e.g., Meriwether, supra note 159, at 13 (“In short, a foreign plaintiff is a foreign
plaintiff, and it matters little (maybe not at all) how connected that plaintiff is with the United
States, or how its business affects domestic commerce.”). See also Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d
at 823 (stating in dicta that even if Motorola and its subsidiaries could be considered as a single
entity that it would not have changed the court’s outcome because it “would have been injured
abroad when ‘it’ purchased the price-fixed components).
182. Id. at 824 (quoting Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165).
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countries have any incentive to prosecute “when their nationals engage
in hardcore cartel conduct directed at a huge U.S. consumer market”
that caused harm in that, opposed to its own, market.183
B. Comity Analysis: A Possible Solution to Interpreting the FTAIA?
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit may have initially reached a more
reasonable conclusion in its first decision of Motorola Mobility had the
court taken a different interpretational approach, such as one taken by
the Supreme Court. Because the FTAIA’s effect test reflects an
evaluation of a US jurisdictional claim, a possible method of aiding the
courts’ construction of what a “direct” effect entails may be to follow
Empagran’s example and in fact employ a comity analysis.184 The two
most recent comity principle constructions, as discussed, are in
Hartford Fire and Empagran. However, the different comity
approaches the Supreme Court undertakes in both cases result in
standards that are under-inclusive and over-inclusive, respectively.
The Supreme Court’s approach in Hartford Fire suggested the
unhelpfulness, if not irrelevance, of comity if there was no true conflict
183. Id.; Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 860 (observing that governments have no incentive to
prosecute domestic export cartels because they “would logically be pleased to reap economic
rents from other countries”); Meriwether, supra note 159, at 13 (critiquing the Seventh Circuit’s
approach in relying on comity considerations, particularly in light of Hsiung where no “serious
concerns of excessive or unwarranted antitrust enforcement” were raised).
184. See Saskatchewan Minn-Chem Brief, supra note 3, at 19-22 (arguing that principles
of international comity should be used in interpreting the FTAIA’s “direct” criterion); BREYER,
supra note 7, at 100 (discussing the FTAIA’s effects test exceptions that would give rise to
Sherman Act claim); Max Huffman, A Retrospective on Twenty-Five Years of the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 285, 315-16 (2007) (describing the FTAIA’s
“direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable” condition as a codification of the Alcoa effects
test in the form of an objective version of the test’s intent requirement); supra note 35 and
accompanying text. As suggested in Empagran, comity analyses may look different in
governmental actions in comparison with private damages cases. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at
170-71. This Note addresses the latter, particularly because comity at the government level may
be, and in many cases is, addressed by positive comity provisions in bilateral agreements. See
supra § III.A.2.
It is worth noting, however, that the FTAIA is silent is to whether a comity balancing test
is proper in the statute’s construction. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 10 (1982) (“[T]he bill is
intended neither to prevent nor to encourage additional judicial recognition of the special
international characteristics of transactions. If a court determines that the requirements for the
subject matter jurisdiction are met, this bill would have no effect on the courts’ ability to employ
notions of comity . . . or otherwise to take account of the international character of the
transaction.”); Griffin, supra note 15, at 162 (“Congress took a neutral stance towards the Ninth
Circuit’s ‘jurisdictional rule of reason’ analysis, indicating that the Act simply stated the
requirements for jurisdiction and was not intended to prevent or encourage balancing tests that
might limit exercise of that jurisdiction.”).
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of laws.185 Hartford Fire’s comity test is under-inclusive in the sense
that comity considerations would rarely be triggered, perhaps only in
cases where a foreign state established laws mandating anticompetitive
behavior.186 Indeed, the First Circuit in Nippon Paper suggested that
Hartford Fire had “stunted” the growth of comity in antitrust, and
Professor Eleanor Fox proclaimed that “[the decision in Hartford Fire]
gives U.S. jurists and enforcers license to disregard the interests of nonAmericans.”187
Empagran’s comity analysis, on the other hand, may be rigidly
over-inclusive to the point where important US antitrust law objectives,
such as deterrence and remedy, may go unserved. Turning its back on
the Supreme Court’s previous holdings in Continental Ore and Pfizer,
the decision’s use of comity may in fact have created “a handicap going
forward [that] would lead to under-deterrence as well as unfairness.”188
As Judge Higginbotham’s dissent in Den Norske v. HeereMac stresses,
the FTAIA does not alter Pfizer’s affirmation of foreign plaintiffs’
ability to sue under the Sherman Act, which was expressly approved in
the statute’s legislative history.189
V. SOLVING THE COURTS’ INCONSISTENT INTERPRETATION
OF THE FTAIA AND APPLICATION OF COMITY PRINCIPLES: A
COMITY BALANCING TEST
Interpreting the FTAIA has proven to be challenging and
problematic. Apart from the deficiencies associated with the treatment
of Motorola and its subsidiaries, Motorola Mobility may have been
better decided by using a comity balancing test similar to the one in
Timberlane, which during its time was regarded as a middle-of-the-

185. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798-99; Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 7 n.11
(commenting on Hartford Fire’s approach to comity).
186. See, e.g., Gerber, supra note 139, at 296 (“[T]he Court appeared to dispense with
balancing considerations, at least for most cases”).
187. Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 8; Eleanor Fox, National Law, Global Markets, and
Hartford Fire: Eyes Wide Shut, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 73, 77 (2000). See also Waller, Twilight,
supra note 64, at 569 (discussing the effect of Hartford Fire on the use of comity analysis in US
antitrust jurisprudence).
188. Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 9.
189. 241 F.3d 420, 434 n.12 (5th Cir. 2001) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting); see also Pfizer,
434 U.S. at 313 (“Yet it is clear that a foreign corporation is entitled to sue for treble damages,
since the definition of ‘person’ contained in the Sherman and Clayton Acts explicitly includes
‘corporations and associations existing under or authorized by . . . the laws of any foreign
country.’”).

2017]

INTERNATIONAL COMITY BALANCING TEST

271

road approach between American Banana and Alcoa.190 Balancing tests
can be expensive and may invite greater litigation, but here courts have
already sufficiently narrowed the spectrum of hypothetical cases to
stifle any increase in dockets that the balancing test may otherwise
cause.191
Despite the FTAIA’s ambiguity, the decisions in Hartford Fire,
Nippon Paper, Den Norske, and Empagran contain sufficient
consistencies that provide instruction on what type of conduct and
injury the FTAIA will exclude from US antitrust jurisdiction. From
Hartford Fire and Nippon Paper we understand that the FTAIA does
not stand in the way of a classic effects doctrine claim, that is, one
which involves defendants that directly harm US consumers, and
specifically a US plaintiff, irrespective of where the defendant engages
in the illegal conduct. The decision in Empagran instructs when
conduct may be beyond the Sherman Act’s reach, i.e., when a claim is
brought by a non-US. plaintiff to redress foreign injury, especially
when the defendant is another foreign national.192 The Fifth Circuit and
the Supreme Court made clear that the United States is no longer in the
business of acting as the world’s antitrust enforcer.193 Additionally,
Empagran explains that the FTAIA requires a defendant’s foreign

190. Matthew C. Franker, Note, Restoration: International Merger Review in the Wake of
General Electric/Honeywell and the Triumphant Return of Negative Comity, 36 Geo. Wash. Int’l
L. Rev. 877, 907 (2004) (citing the 1987 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations in
characterizing Timberlane’s analysis as a “middle-of-the-road approach”); James E. Ward,
Comment, “Is That Your Final Answer?” The Patchwork Jurisprudence Surrounding the
Presumption Against Territoriality, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 715, 721 (2002) (commenting on how
Timberlane’s approach gained widespread acceptance by falling between strict territoriality and
the effects test).
191. See, e.g., Doug Melamed, Thoughts About Exclusive Dealing, in EUROPEAN
COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2007: A REFORMED APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82 EC 433, 438
(Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Mel Marquis eds., 2008) (criticizing balancing tests pertaining to
antitrust law).
192. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 171-75 (holding that the Sherman Act is unavailable to
foreign plaintiffs with foreign injury); Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 428 (“A transaction between two
foreign firms . . . should not . . . come within the reach of our antitrust laws.”).
193. See, e.g., Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 431 (“Any reading of the FTAIA authorizing
jurisdiction” over claims brought by non-US plaintiffs against non-US defendants to recover
foreign harm “would open United States courts to global claims on a scale never intended by
Congress.”). See also Diamond, supra note 12, at 823 n.125, n.126 (citing sources highlighting
the dangers granting expanded access to foreign plaintiffs under the FTAIA).
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conduct to cause a cognizable domestic effect, which in turn must have
caused the plaintiff’s injury.194
That leaves the question of what type of effect “gives rise to a
claim” that the Ninth and Seventh Circuits have attempted to address:
a US plaintiff bringing a claim against a non-US defendant
encompassing wholly foreign conduct and an effect felt in the United
States, such as if the US clothier from the opening hypothetical decided
to sue the Pakistani textile manufacturers in the United States.195 It is
this type of narrow case, where prescriptive jurisdiction hangs on the
“directness” of the effect, that a balancing test would prove beneficial
in the absence of a circuit split resolution.196 So, while the Supreme
Court has cautioned against case-by-case comity inquiries, this
balancing test is only employable in a small universe of cases.197
Consequently, the balancing test would not be “too complex to prove
workable,” as imagined by the Court in Empagran, particularly taking
into account the stylized factors to be discussed.198 But even if the case
technically meets the standards for FTAIA’s exemption, the balancing
test may still be used to evaluate whether extraterritorial application of
US antitrust laws is apt.199
Chiefly, this balancing test would supplement the FTAIA. The
underlying impetus for the FTAIA’s enactment – responding to
international criticism of expansive US extraterritorial jurisdiction and
to calls for recognizing foreign sovereignty where the basis for US
194. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 173-75 (demonstrating that linguistically the most sensible
reading of “gives rise to a claim” in the FTAIA refers to “plaintiff’s claim” or “the claim at
issue”).
195. Or, conversely, a non-US plaintiff bringing suit against a US defendant for
exclusively foreign conduct and a domestic effect and injury. Suppose a US oil producer enters
into a worldwide conspiracy to fix the price of tar produced at its Canadian refinery. The
producer sells at the fixed, anticompetitive price to one of its wholly-owned subsidiaries in the
United States with instruction to pass on the price to downstream purchasers in the United States.
One of those purchasers is a German firm. While the conduct in question was exclusively
foreign, it seemingly produced an effect in the United States that may “give rise to a claim” for
the German firm under the Sherman Act. As mentioned, though the FTAIA was meant to limit
antitrust liability for US sellers transacting abroad with foreign buyers, lawmakers still wanted
to afford foreign purchasers the protection of US laws when transacting within the United States.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
196. Lotes provides even tighter parameters in holding that in order for an effect to “give
rise to a claim,” the “effect” must precede the alleged antitrust injury. See 753 F.3d at 414-15.
197. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 168.
198. Id. at 168-69 (declining to employ a balancing test).
199. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 13 (1982) (mentioning that the FTAIA would not bar courts
from “employ[ing] notions of comity . . . or otherwise [taking] account of the international
character of the transaction.”).
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prescriptive jurisdiction is weak – functions as this balancing test’s
modus operandi. While the difficulty in interpreting “direct” has
instigated its introduction, the balancing test does not attempt to shed
any more light on the FTAIA’s contemplation of “direct.” Instead, it
provides an alternative framework to properly apply the FTAIA where
the statute’s language makes it impossible to do so.
As was the balancing test in Timberlane, a balancing test here may
also be criticized as leaving too much discretion over political inquiries
(i.e., foreign policy considerations) to the judiciary rather than to the
executive and legislative branches, where such decisions may rightly
belong.200 Professor William Dodge, while asserting that US courts
should engage in judicial unilateralism rather than international comity
considerations, points out that the judiciary plays an important
complementary role to a country’s political branches by encouraging
dialogue and negotiation between sovereigns.201 Though Congress and
antitrust agencies may be better suited than courts to take account of
the interest of other nations, courts are nonetheless faced with the task
200. See Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 7 (observing that antitrust regulators are
better suited to weigh foreign countries’ interests, “as well as take account of other agencies’ or
courts’ analysis of the same issues”); John Byron Sandage, Note, Forum Non Conveniens and
the Extraterritorial Approach of United States Antitrust Law, 94 YALE L.J. 1693, 1699-1701
(1985) (criticizing “interest-based revisionist” approaches that engaged in interest balancing as
“both inappropriate and unworkable because it involves courts in weighing sensitive political
and diplomatic concerns traditionally considered nonjusticiable.”). Indeed, antitrust authorities
are attempting to avoid unnecessary prosecution by increasing cooperation with foreign
counterparts. See Terzaken, supra note 70 (detailing cooperation efforts); supra § III.A.2. In
addition, the DOJ has established an internal policy to use wider discretion when defendants are
facing parallel enforcement actions abroad. Terzaken, supra note 70 (discussing DOJ efforts to
curtail prosecutorial overkill).
201. Dodge, supra note 2, at 106-07. American courts are also well-versed in taking into
account foreign interests through allowing sovereign representatives to articulate official
positions in litigation. See, e.g., Empagran, 542 U.S. at 167-68 (relying on non-US government
amicus curiae briefs asserting national interests in considering international comity); In re
Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d at 179 (“When, as in this instance, we receive from a foreign
government an official statement explicating its own laws and regulations, we are bound to
extend that explication the deference long accorded such proffers received from foreign
governments.”); BREYER, supra note 7, at 92 (“Since there is no Supreme Court of the World,
national courts must act piecemeal, without direct coordination, in seeking interpretations that
can dovetail rather than clash with the working of foreign statutes. And so our Court does, and
should, listen to foreign voices, to those who understand and can illuminate relevant foreign
laws and practices.” (emphasis added)).
“Judicial unilateralism,” as defined by Professor Dodge, implies that courts should only
consider whether or not the forum’s legislature intended to regulate the conduct at issue without
regard to foreign interests. See Dodge, supra note 2, at 104-05 (“[A] court should apply a statute
extraterritorially whenever doing so appears to advance the purposes of the statute and should
not worry about resolving conflicts of jurisdiction with other nations.”); see also supra note 16.
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of weighing those interests when judging a party’s right to redress in
private antitrust litigation.202
The balancing test should be an exercise in both comity and
cooperation, an attempt to harmonize counterpoints in the debate over
antitrust extraterritoriality. As Professor Fox posits, the question is not
“when should we defer to the inconsistent interests of other nations?”
but rather “how can the antitrust jurisdictions of the world work
together to maximize their shared interest in competitive markets, to
the benefit of consumers and robust or potentially robust business?”203
Indeed, this comports with Supreme Court’s current approach to
comity analysis of harmonization rather than avoiding conflict among
laws.204 Accordingly, the test will have a slightly different focus than
the one constructed by the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane, which reflects
an outdated period of international antitrust regulation lacking potent
modern enforcement tools such as amnesty programs. It will, however,
encourage the growth of overall worldwide antitrust enforcement, both
public and private, which ultimately contributes to properly
functioning international markets.205
The challenge of achieving proper adjudication of an antitrust
claim consisting of conduct and injury in two different jurisdictions is
202. See In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d at 179 (highlighting that the court’s
decision rested on the submissions from the Chinese government); BREYER, supra note 7, at 107
(noting that the Empagran Court reached its conclusion with the aid of briefs filed by the
executive branches of foreign governments); see also supra note 201.
Outside of filing amicus briefs in private litigation, regulators are otherwise unhelpful for
weighing national interests as they pertain to international comity. See, e.g., Diamond, supra
note 12, at 813 (“While the government does consider comity before bringing cases against
foreign nationals under federal antitrust laws, the majority of litigated cases involving foreign
nationals, and therefore the development of the case law applying the principle of comity . . .
have been centered in private antitrust litigation.”).
203. Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 7. See also Stephen M. Axinn & Christina Shin,
Globalization and Antitrust: The Last Forty Years and Beyond, 2014 FORDHAM COMP. L. INST.
514 (B. Hawk ed. 2015) (“[C]onvergence [of national antitrust laws] – whether in connection
with merger doctrine, cartel enforcement or single firm conduct – is necessary for any advanced
economy.”).
204. BREYER, supra note 7, at 96 (“[T]he Court no longer seeks only to avoid direct
conflicts among laws of different nations; it seeks, rather, to harmonize the enforcement of what
are often similar national laws.”). See also supra § III.B.3.
205. See, e.g., Erin C. Fuse Brown & Jaime S. King, The Double-Edged Sword of Health
Care Integration: Consolidation and Cost Control, 92 Ind. L.J. 55, 85 (2016) (“The goal of any
antitrust enforcement action is to restore the opportunity for the market to function without the
illegal restraints on competition.”); Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power in Power Markets: The
Field-Rate Doctrine and Competition in Electricity, 46 MICH. J.L. REFORM 921, 923 (2013)
(“Anticompetitive conduct reduces economic efficiency and transfers wealth from consumers to
producers.”).
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that national laws must conform to a market that ignores national
borders.206 With this in mind, the goal should be to promote
adjudication in the most efficient locale in an effort to maximize world
welfare, foster growth of antitrust jurisdictions, and avoid
overregulation.207 There are currently over 120 antitrust jurisdictions,
many of which are new antitrust jurisdictions or have enacted fresh
laws allowing for greater access to private redress, such as Israel
(2006), China (2008), the European Union (2014), the United Kingdom
(2015), and Hong Kong (2015).208 Letting the laws of these
jurisdictions develop and inculcate international standards for antitrust
enforcement strengthens the deterrence of anticompetitive behavior
and the ability of injured parties to seek recompense.209 Achieving
206. Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 7-8.
207. See id. at 7 n.13, 8. See also supra § III.B.3.
208. See generally Class Actions Law; Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of
China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug.
1, 2008) 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68 (China); EC Directive; CRA
2015; The Competition Ordinance, (2012) Cap. 619 (H.K.) (operational on December 14, 2015).
See also Axinn & Shin, supra note 203, at 513-15 (discussing the proliferation of antitrust
jurisdictions since the 1970s, amounting to a current 125 sovereign jurisdictions with
competition authorities); Consumer & Consumer Protection Authorities Worldwide, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/ international/competition-consumer-protectionauthorities-worldwide [https://perma.cc/8ZMU-7EY4] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (listing
worldwide competition authorities); supra §§ II.B; III. China and Hong Kong, however, have
not yet instituted a private right to action, though as noted above overly expansive availability
of US antitrust claims for non-US private recovery may still have a detrimental effect on public
enforcement efforts, including developing national jurisprudence. See supra note 110 and
accompanying text. For greater detail on worldwide anti-cartel regimes, see ANTI-CARTEL
ENFORCEMENT WORLDWIDE (Maher M. Dabbah & Barry E. Hawk eds., 3 vols., 2009).
209. See, e.g., First, supra note 16, at 732-34 (arguing that international political consensus
is integral to effective international antitrust enforcement and that the case-by-case common law
process of law development is the optimal path to that consensus in the absence of a single
system of or approach to market place regulation); Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev.,
Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels 2
(May 1998), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/2350130.pdf [https://perma.cc/35HUTEWZ] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (“[C]loser co-operation is necessary to deal effectively with
anticompetitive practices in one country that affect other countries and harm international
trade.”). As noted above, while national recourse for compensating private loss is currently
available in a minority of antitrust jurisdictions, it is increasingly acknowledged as a necessary
tool for under-resourced national competition authorities. See Pheasant, supra note 11, at 59
(explaining that the European Commission “decided that it would be appropriate to enhance the
role of private enforcement to support and supplement public enforcement of the competition
rules” given insufficient resources for governmental competition authorities); Edward
Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 84 OR. L. REV. 147, 153-54 (2005) (“Congress created
the private right of action to supplement public enforcement because it was aware that the
government would not have the necessary resources to uncover, investigate, and prosecute all
violations of antitrust laws.”); see also supra note 25.
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greater international involvement in turn would ostensibly mitigate
some of the need behind extraterritorial application of US antitrust
law.210
Several factors offer helpful guidance. First and most significant,
does the foreign jurisdiction have an enforcement program in place
with penalties to deter future anticompetitive conduct and to allow a
plaintiff to effectively pursue remedial action at both a micro and macro
level? Emphasis should be placed here on deterrence.211 For instance,
Judge Wood noted in Minn-Chem: “The host country for [an export]
cartel will often have no incentive to prosecute it. [It] would logically
be pleased to reap economic rents from other countries.”212 Moreover,
such host countries’ legislatures will often not outlaw conduct that
benefits the home state and results only in foreign harm.213 It should
also be noted that while many jurisdictions have public enforcement
programs, many do not have compensatory channels for private
litigants and where those do exist private recovery efforts are seldom
brought.214 Second, would extraterritorial application of the US
210. See supra § II.B. See also Fox, Remedies, supra note 14, at 580 (explaining that the
United States as the lone robust enforcer of antitrust law is not enough to deter cartels
worldwide).
211. See Stiglitz & Orszag Brief, supra note 67, at 7 (noting “the importance of examining
the strength of antitrust systems in other countries to evaluate whether global cartels are likely
to be deterred”). In recent years, roughly a third of jurisdictions with antitrust regimes besides
the United States and the EC have begun to aggressively enforce their national antitrust laws,
including Brazil, China, India, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea. See Terzaken,
supra note 70.
212. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 860. See also Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 12 (“In
the case of export cartels, for example, it is often said in developed countries: This is not our
problem. Let the importing country sue.”).
213. See, e.g., Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (granting immunity from
antitrust liability exporter combinations that aided the war effort); FTAIA (exempting export
transactions from US antitrust liability); Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§
4001-16 (encouraging growth of American exports in part by modifying the application of
antitrust laws to certain export trade). See also Eleanor M. Fox & Janusz A. Ordover, The
Harmonization of Competition and Trade Law – The Case for Modest Linkages of Law and
Limits to Parochial State Action, 19 WORLD COMP. 5, 17 (1995) (“Almost all nations either
have export exemptions from their cartel laws, or their law expressly does not reach outbound
trade.”); Immenga, supra note 16, at 96ff (highlighting US, German, European, and Japanese
competition laws in discussing the conflicts between trade regulation that exempts domestic
export cartels from competition law regulation and competition policy).
214. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Report on the Nature and Impact of Hard Core
Cartels and Sanctions Against Cartels Under National Competition Laws 15 (2002),
http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/2081831.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HJA-5LUU ] (last
visited Oct. 26, 2017) [hereinafter OECD 2002 Report] (discussing private cartel enforcement
in OECD countries); supra notes 11, 19; see also supra § III. Changes are being made, though.
As of 2014, the EC issued Directive 2014/104/EU requiring alteration in national laws to
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antitrust law compromise the efficacy of the DOJ’s amnesty program?
It is widely acknowledged that the amnesty program serves as an
important cartel detection and discovery tool in antitrust enforcement,
so courts would be remiss to forego its consideration lest the very
purpose the balancing test strives to fulfill be defeated.215 Of course,
this should also not be seen as the dispositive factor. As discussed
above in Part II.B, the ability for private parties to enforce antitrust laws
while receiving compensation for incurred harm plays an important
role in deterring businesses from committing antitrust violations. Third,
if there is a foreign enforcement program available to the plaintiff and
the alleged conduct occurs in several foreign jurisdictions, are there any
constraints that would stop plaintiff from multiple recoveries for the
same conduct and injury? While the laws of most antitrust jurisdictions
base damages on domestic harm, some have punitive measures that
allow private plaintiffs to receive an amount greater than the harm
suffered.216 This last factor addresses the potential for
overcompensation if the incentive and ability exists for a plaintiff to
bring suit in different jurisdictions.217
One such solution to this last issue may be found through applying
procedural principles interjurisdictionally. In addressing how to reach
optimal deterrence levels for international cartels while nurturing
facilitate private enforcement of competition law. See supra § II.B. Additionally, other countries,
such as Israel and the United Kingdom, have made way for class action-style recovery. Id.
215. See generally Bill Baer, Ass. Att’y General Antitrust Div. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Prosecuting Antitrust Crimes, Remarks as Prepared for the Georgetown University Law Center
Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/
file/517741/download [https://perma.cc/9SME-6X96] (archived Oct. 26, 2017); Scott D.
Hammond, Deputy Ass. Att’y General for Crim. Enforcement Antitrust Div. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades,
Presented at the 24th Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime (Feb. 25, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518241/download [https://perma.cc/MGD9-YZMU] (last visited
Oct. 26, 2017); Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. Hammond & Belinda A. Barnett, Deterrence and
Detection of Cartels: Using All the Tools and Sanctions, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 207 (2011). See
also Antitrust Modernization Comm’n, Report and Recommendations 253, 256 (Apr. 2007),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/toc.htm [https://perma.cc/HH8Y4U7F] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017). See also supra § III.
216. OECD 2002 Report, supra note 214, at 15, 19 n.24 (discussing the debate around
punitive damages in private recompense cases as providing either insufficient or excessive
deterrence, noting that New Zealand’s study of the issue concluded that punitive damages were
necessary, but only as exemplary and not treble because the former would provide “more
accurate signals” and “offer greater fairness.”).
217. See, e.g., id. (discussing punitive damages in private antitrust litigation, where
besides the United States, New Zealand has also adopted a punitive damage regime); supra §
III. However, as discussed most jurisdictions do not provide a private right to sue under national
antitrust laws. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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growth of developing competition authority regimes, Professor Michal
Gal has proposed extending the doctrine of collateral estoppel to other
national jurisdictions, a tool she dubbed the Recognition-of-Judgments
Mechanism.218 The Mechanism’s primary aim is to enhance “domestic
as well as global deterrence and welfare.”219 In theory, it would enable
a decision entered in the United States (or elsewhere) to be the basis
for bringing suits against defendants in their respective jurisdictions by
allowing those jurisdictions to rely on factual findings of a reliable and
fair foreign decision maker.220 Plaintiffs would only have to prove harm
to their domestic markets and that the foreign decision meets some prespecified criteria that ensure reasonable and fair legal reliance.221
Professor Gal’s mechanism is not without precedent. She points out
that Brazilian antitrust authorities adopted a less refined version of the
mechanism in its Vitamins Case cartel decision.222 There, the Brazilian
antitrust authorities relied on US and EC decisions concerning the
worldwide cartel, treating them as established facts.223
The Mechanism promotes efficient distribution of relief by
location of harm, permitting plaintiffs to be made whole but not to
recover in excess of the injury – a step towards effectively stripping
violators of anticompetitive profits without the need for punitive
measures such as trebling damages.224 Professor Gal explains that this
also encourages the development of newer antitrust regimes that face
significant resource constraints by reducing the cost of adjudication,
further serving the overarching objective of the balancing test.225
This list, while not exhaustive of all potentially relevant factors,
provides the appropriate framework to achieve the goal of enhancing
global antitrust enforcement in tandem with maximizing world
economic welfare. An example of how this balancing test would work
may be abstracted from our previous hypothetical with changed facts:
A is an American company that procures nickel to be smelted and used
218. Michal S. Gal, Free Movement of Judgments: Increasing Deterrence of International
Cartels Through Jurisdictional Reliance, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 58 (2010).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 73-75.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 60-61.
223. Id. at 61.
224. See id. at 62-63.
225. Id. at 73-74 (explaining that the Mechanism removes the costliest part of the process,
i.e., proving the existence of an international cartel, and limits litigation to the effect on local
markets).
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in the production of industrial turbines. A purchases nickel from the
leading nickel mining company B in the Philippines, which is actively
engaged in fixing the price of nickel with the second leading nickel
mining company C, which is located in another country. Both B and C
make up over fifty percent of global nickel production and sales, and
all of B’s customers reside outside of the Philippines. The point of sale
for these transactions occurs in the Philippines through A’s Japanese
subsidiary, which exists for the sole purpose of purchasing raw material
and reselling it to the parent company at cost. Manufacture of the
turbines takes place both abroad and in the United States at A’s
proprietary factories, though finished turbines from non-US factories
are routinely shipped to end users in the United States and vice versa.226
Finally, after a change of ownership, C gets cold feet and applies for
amnesty with the DOJ in order to avoid potential liability, though A
had recently begun to become suspicious after realizing steady
incremental increases in the price of nickel despite both B and C
discovering new, vast nickel deposits. After the DOJ successfully
procures a judgment against B after trial, A sues B to recover treble
damages from overcharges in US federal court.227
This hypothetical represents a situation not clearly resolved by
Hartford Fire or Empagran. Here, we have an American plaintiff that
purchases a price-fixed component in purely foreign transactions
through a foreign subsidiary to be incorporated in a finished product
that is then sold on to US consumers. Ostensibly, the relevant legal
question involves whether there has been a “direct, substantial, or
foreseeable” effect from B’s conduct on US commerce. But in such a
case where “direct” may be difficult to define, the previously described
comity balancing test provides an alternative method of assessing
whether US prescriptive jurisdiction is indeed proper. Notably, unlike
the LCD panels in Motorola Mobility, the price-fixed component in this
hypothetical is a fungible good that would not be a prominent feature
on the finished good. Therefore, it would be difficult for A to argue that
it was “targeted” in the same way as Motorola to avoid an indirect
purchaser characterization.

226. In this case, a function of available production capacity, timing and volume of orders,
and cheap shipping costs might explain this type of delivery system.
227. We can assume for the sake of this hypothetical that the United States has personal
jurisdiction over B, that venue is proper, and that there are no successful forum non conveniens
arguments.
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The first factor operates in two parts. At the threshold, it considers
whether the Philippines has relevant antitrust laws governing the export
conduct that may provide A redress. If those laws exist, the factor then
considers whether the Philippines would itself enforce them against a
domestic firm that profits from selling to foreign customers. This
becomes particularly relevant if the firm has already been subject to
criminal liability in the United States and where the cartel’s conduct
has little if any negative effect on the Philippines. This is important
because, assuming that A’s subsidiary is the only entity that made
purchases of the price-fixed goods during the period of conspiracy,
Japan would have felt no effect and accordingly would have little if any
interest in enforcing its own antitrust laws.
The second factor assesses the amnesty program’s role in the
discovery of the cartel at hand and any associated detriment arising
from exposing B to private antitrust liability. In the present case, A may
have been able to uncover the scheme on its own, though it is unclear
whether it would have had the resources to bring suit itself assuming it
was able to pass the pleading stage and reach discovery.
Finally, the third factor contemplates the potential for being
overcompensated for conduct that could be adjudicated in a non-US
jurisdiction. If, as in the present case, a judgment exists on the issue of
whether the defendant conspired with others to fix prices, Professor
Gal’s collateral estoppel mechanism may provide some reason for US
litigants to seek relief from the defendant’s home jurisdiction in light
of the questionable effect on US commerce, assuming that the country
has the requisite antitrust laws and accepts the United States’ protective
procedural measures in reaching such a judgment. The opposite would
be true if no issues had yet been litigated and resolved.
Considering these factors in total, maximizing economic welfare
through properly functioning international markets and encouraging
the development of international cartel enforcement may in fact
counsel against adjudication in the United States if recourse for private
recovery exists in the foreign jurisdiction. Deference and restraint are
justified if it results in net benefit to such global welfare.228 After all,
“[n]ational antitrust should operate in the shadow of the true global
market.”229

228. See Fox, Remedies, supra note 14, at 581.
229. Fox, AMC Hearing, supra note 65, at 8.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Note argues that in order to create a suitable environment for
international private redress an international comity balancing test
should be introduced into US jurisprudence through the opportunity
provided by the FTAIA “direct effect” criterion. Though the United
States has historically acted as the world’s courtroom for victimized
private parties to seek recovering of antitrust injury, worldwide
jurisdictions are beginning to develop their own legal regimes of
antitrust enforcement, deterrence, and private recompense. To
encourage this development, US courts should embrace the current
Supreme Court’s approach to comity as one predicated upon global
harmonization rather than conflict avoidance.
The recent efforts of resolving the “direct effect” definition
dispute have been unfruitful and have ultimately produced puzzling
decisions, including one in which foreign defendants were subject to
criminal liability under the Sherman Act but not civil liability. The
proposed balancing test responds to the current confusion stemming
from these efforts by providing an alternative framework through
which to realize the statute’s purpose. While the late Justice Scalia
cautioned against using comity balancing tests to determine whether to
properly subject foreign defendants to US antitrust law, limiting
parameters provided by existing case law establish sufficient
conditions to permit a balancing test.
This balancing test would guide courts in determining the
propriety of extraterritorial application of US antitrust law for specific
cases involving proscribed foreign anticompetitive conduct under the
auspices of promoting the development of global antitrust enforcement
and maximizing world economic welfare. However, instead of
weighing traditional comity considerations as in Timberlane, the
comity balancing test proposed in this Note would focus instead on
these objectives, i.e., promoting the development of global antitrust
enforcement and maximizing world economic welfare, as an extension
of the Supreme Court’s harmonization approach. Ultimately, the
balancing test would better allow the United States to contemplate and
incorporate foreign interests in whether to apply US antitrust law,
promoting international dialogue and encouraging growth of foreign
private antitrust recourse.
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